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Acronyms
ALPRO The Alliance for Progress. A U.S.-sponsored economic development aid program for
Latin America established in 1961 under John F. Kennedy intended to preempt the spread of
communist revolution.
CORHABIT The 1936 Popular Housing Fund was one of Chile’s oldest housing related
organizations. When merged into CORVI in 1953, CORHABIT was relegated to gathering data
more than financing homes.
CORFO The Corporation of Production and Development, created in 1940 to assist recovery
from the 1939 Chillán earthquake. Used to stimulate development throughout the country more
broadly.
CORMU The Corporation of Urban Improvement, created in 1965. The organization sponsored
many of Santiago’s modernist projects in the 1970s.
CORVI The Housing Corporation, was fashioned when CORHABIT was merged into the
Urbanism Section in 1953. The organization was under the guidance of Luis Muñoz Maluschka,
disciple of Brunner.
IADB The Inter-American Development Bank created in 1959 greatly augmented U.S. spending
capabilities in the region.
IA-ECOSOC The Inter-American Economic and Social Council, functioned to provide ALPRO
aid recipients with technical advice, conduct detailed studies, and report back to U.S. offices.
MINVU The Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, created in 1965 to keep up with Frei’s
promises. Consolidated other organizations like CORVI and CORHABIT. Tasked to oversee
planning and housing-related policy.
4

MIR The Revolutionary Left Movement, a far-left group that opposed the Allende presidency.
They organized several land invasions in the 1970s.
PC Communist Party, established 1922.
PDC The Christian Democratic Party, founded 1957.
UP Popular Unity, the coalition of left groups that supported the election of Salvador Allende in
1970.
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Figure 1.1. Map of Chile (Source: http://www.mapsopensource.com/chile-map-black-andwhite.html)
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Figure 1.2. Map of Santiago and Valparaíso area (Source: https://moon.com/maps/southamerica/chile/)
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Introduction
Rural Chileans migrated to cities in droves from the late nineteenth century through the
1970s, mostly to the capital of Santiago and the nearby major port of Valparaíso. Economic
dependence on copper and nitrates, an outdated, oligarchic class structure, the concentration of
wealth in the agricultural realm, and natural disasters like earthquakes, prompted dislocation.
Migrants transformed the nation from a largely rural society to a decidedly urban onefrom one
third of the population living in cities in the early twentieth century to two thirds by the 1970s.
Chile’s urbanization was one of the more rapid and extensive of all Latin America. A Chilean
preoccupation with housing the urban poor was rooted in this massive demographic shift, as poor
rural migrants quickly overwhelmed available housing and infrastructure.
The squatter and slum population, in large part jobless or partially employed women and
their children, struggled to live in challenging if not outright dangerous environments. Through
local organizing efforts squatters and other poor urban strata succeeded in extracting policies and
programs of immediate impact on their daily lives, such as affordable housing, and access to
public utilities, space, health care, and other essentials. The advocacy of the urban poor and
those championing their struggle steered the entire nation in a progressive direction that resulted
in a brief period of much-needed reform under presidents Eduardo Frei Montalva (Christian
Democrat 1964-70) and Salvador Allende (Marxist 1970-73), before Pinochet’s nearly two
decades of repression.
A large progressive middle class and an organized working class developed in Chile
alongside urbanization and modernization. The interests of these contingents were increasingly
reflected and represented in the establishment and growth of new parties and unions that also
8

consistently advanced a preoccupation with low-income housing throughout the twentieth
century. Housing was promoted as a universal right in Chile as early as the 1920s.
However, while Chilean housing programs were ostensibly designed to assist lower
sectors, they instead ended up disproportionately benefitting the middle sectors of society, even
into the late 1960s. Despite efforts to the contrary, this situation did not markedly change until
Salvador Allende’s short three years in power.
Chileans attacked housing shortages and rapidly growing slums with a combination of
private and state-funded initiatives. The result was an array of institutions that were private,
public, or some hybrid of the two. The creation in 1965 of MINVU (The Chilean Ministry of
Housing and Urbanism) centralized and condensed most of the public institutions into one
umbrella organization. This gave the Frei and Allende administrations an unprecedented and
efficient tool for producing and repairing homes, as well as planning neighborhoods and building
public works and utilities.
I hope in this thesis to shed light on how the intellectual trends within circles of technical
experts influenced and substantiated prevailing public opinion and government policy regarding
urban housing. Chilean architects, planners, engineers, and other professionals were in continual
dialogue with their European counterparts, dating back to the nineteenth century. This provided
for refined approaches to housing, planning, and construction that maintained pace with
worldwide practices. Although Chile was not visited by influential modernists like Le Corbusier
and Josep Lluís Sert, Chileans selected their own set of foreign professionals to learn from, such
as Austrian planner, Karl Brunner in the 1930s, who many perceive as having delayed the
adoption of modernist approaches in Chile given his outspoken dislike of Le Corbusier.
9

Nonetheless, historical, economic, and political contexts aligned in a way that Chileans began to
pioneer modernist approaches to housing shortages and were recognized for their efforts
internationally. By the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, colossal housing shortages in cities and lack of
resources necessitated a turn to modernist principles of urban design and mass apartment blocks.
Global advances in science and technology dictated that urban studies embody precision
and professionalism, backed by concrete statistical figures. In this spirit, constructing a new
town or housing community was a complex procedure—one that normally required detailed
demographic studies, surveys of the natural landscape, and the employment of considerable
power and machinery.1 The involvement in projects of sociologists, anthropologists, developers,
religious leaders, political leaders, geographers, and technicians of all stripes accompanied the
coordination of architects, urban planners and engineers. This history suggests that much is left
to be discovered within the records left by these experts, as numerous and scattered as they are.
This thesis is the product of weaving together information culled from available books
and articles on these subjects with personal research done at the Chilean National Archives in
Santiago and the Paul Lester Wiener Collection at the University of Oregon. MINVU provided
most primary source material used in this analysis.

1

Paul Lester Wiener Papers, Special Collections, the University of Oregon Library.
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Chapter 1: Historiography of Urban Housing in Latin America
In the twentieth century, most of Latin America was characterized by urban centers
swelling from influxes of poor rural migrants in search of economic opportunity. English
geographer Alan Gilbert was one of the first authors to theorize about the resulting housing
shortages and the shantytown phenomenon. Gilbert’s many studies were guided by the
fundamental goal of understanding “… how the needs of the urban poor with respect to housing
and servicing are articulated and satisfied.”2 Gilbert worked with survey teams that were
deployed to major cities throughout Latin America with questionnaires. The cities he studied
differed in their historical contexts, political settings, timing of migrations, property relations,
types of housing, etc. Nevertheless, cities developed with “… almost identical suburbs, so that it
is difficult to tell either the shanty towns or the high-income residential areas in one city from
those in another.” Describing the inescapable poverty that characterizes these cities in which
“Traffic congestion, skyscrapers and street children are found everywhere,”3 Gilbert proposes
that a shared struggle against mass poverty arose throughout Latin American cities.
While the results of urban migration may have been similar throughout Latin America,
migration to cities occurred at a dramatic rate in Chile that significantly outpaced its neighbors.
This surge in urban population proved instrumental in shaping the physical development of
2

Alan Gilbert and Peter M. Ward, Housing, the state, and the poor: Policy and practice in three
Latin American Cities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1.
3
Alan Gilbert, The Latin American City (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 1.
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Chile’s cities, as well as government policy on all levels. Poor migrants new to Chile’s cities, in
most cases accustomed to generations of living in isolated or remote areas and unfamiliar with
the conventions of modern western finance and land ownership, encountered a lack of affordable
dwellings, along with a complex bureaucratic process impeding access to scarcely available
state-financed assistance. Families took matters into their own hands, staking out large sections
of vacant land and rapidly transforming them into mosaics of makeshift houses constructed out
of whatever material was available. The authorities tore the shacks down, but the poor
relentlessly reconstructed new ones virtually overnight.
In Chile (in what reads as uniquely Chilean) an expansive vocabulary was employed to
refer to shanties and slums: most famously poblaciones, inhabited by pobladores, but other terms
for poor neighborhoods included callampas, ranchos, conventillos, cités, campamentos, and
tomas. These off-the-grid communities, out of the reaches of municipally provided paved
streets, plumbing, and potable water, were viewed by officials and elite sectors of society (the
church, policy makers, business owners, etc.) as hygienically hazardous moral disaster zones.
The improvement of poor neighborhoods in Latin America hinged on successful
grassroots efforts, as well as overcoming bureaucratic hurdles. In Brodwyn Fischer’s A Poverty
of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro, she illustrates that in
Brazil enfranchisement entailed performing a host of duties that people were often unwilling or
unable to comply with.4 Local organizing is no easy task, yet throughout Latin America groups
of all kinds made their voices heard. In Chile, this ranged from women’s groups, to football
clubs, housing associations and homeless committees, unions, and the Communist Party.
4

Brodwyn Fischer, A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de
Janeiro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 310.
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Latin American social movements celebrated the entirety of the poor masses, not just
those on the assembly lines. Communists, radicals, progressives, and Christians assisted in
navigating modern laws and programs, as well as in articulating the voice and needs of the
informal and peasant populations. There was a vague consensus among many in Latin America
that the poor simply deserved more. Both the impoverished citizens themselves and their
proponents used the umbrella terms like “poor families,” “poor workers,” or the “urban poor” to
identify a population that inhabited various occupations, homes, and neighborhoods.5 Fischer
notes that despite the conventional leftist position on the lumpenproletariat (the informal and
part-time workers outside the realm of mass industrialization, who unlike the factory worker,
were not seen as central to the revolution), party members (capital C Communists) outspokenly
promoted the rights of favela dwellers in the twentieth century. The same can be said for Chile
and the pobladores.
Edward Murphy combines anthropological and historical methods in his book For a
Proper Home: Housing Rights in the Margins of Urban Chile, 1960-2010.6 Murphy writes: “In
mass-market, democratic societies, private property regimes have retained certain exclusive and
hierarchical characteristics, forming much of the material ground upon which class distinctions
develop.” Murphy continues: “Such a foundation links individual comportment with spatial
relations, the distribution of resources, and governance. It has implications for ideas of both
social standing and justice. In the former instance, gaining access to property is about gaining a

They encompassed not just industrial workers and miners but “…washerwomen and domestic
servants, street vendors and odd-jobbers, cobblers, tailors, and workers fallen into the ranks of
the perennially unemployed,” Ibid., 3-4.
6
Edward Murphy, For a Proper Home: housing Rights in the Margins of Urban Chile, 19602010 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 26.
13
5

place in the social order.”7 Perceptions of space and home ownership were intrinsically linked to
social hierarchies and enfranchisement, in what was a gendered and inherently violent process.
Owning property proved the basic means of accessing the benefits of the centralized state, such
that lack of ownership cemented many in the role of underclass citizens. Murphy shows how the
Chilean state imposed itself at the very doorsteps of the shanties, in the form of exclusion and
outright threat. Space, class, gender, and race were fundamentally interconnected in the slums of
Santiago despite promises of equality and reform.
Conservative segments of the population assumed, with some basis, that the slums were
headquarters for radicals, and that the poor were susceptible to recruitment by them. Civil
discontent was associated with poor neighborhoods early in Chile’s urbanization, a reality that
continued into the 1960s and 70s. As far back as the 1940s and the Popular Front era, radicals
and progressives of all stripes spoke up for the homeless and squatters and became active in their
neighborhoods, and they were celebrated in return; in the 1960s this included folk singers like
Violeta Parra,8 and organizers like Gladys Marín.9 By 1970 the poor suburbs surrounding
Santiago became known as the “Red Belt,” and the neighborhood of San Miguel was known as
“Red Country.”10 By the 1970s and 80s riot police would ritually storm into the shanties and
attack protesters, who fiercely fought back. Organizational efforts engaged in by radicals and

7

Ibid., 27.
Murphy, For a Proper Home, 79.
9
Ibid.; Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against
Allende, 1964-1973 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 18; Cathy
Lisa Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1995), 53.
10
San Miguel was adjacent to the well-documented Yarur textile mill, see Peter Winn, The Yarur
Workers and Chile’s Road to Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 84.
14
8

progressives yielded real results for the shanty dwellers who in return committed themselves to
the left.
The Latin American history of housing, shantytowns, and the urban poor is necessarily
interrelated with that of other spheres, for example, the history of public health, disease, and
medicine. Diseases, natural disasters and even the toll of war ripped through poor
neighborhoods, both urban and rural, far too frequently inflicting the greatest tolls on those
already suffering most. In The Ailing City: Health, Tuberculosis, and Culture in Buenos Aires,
1870-1950, Diego Armus examines how disease grew to become associated with the Argentinian
urban poor. He writes of the tuberculosis public health program: “… it ended up, by the second
quarter of the twentieth century, focusing on certain social groups, now defined by their
occupation and place of residence rather than, as in the past, their lifestyles and presumed
morality.”11 Being poor was synonymous with a hazardous, unhealthy, and disease-ridden
existence, such that attempts to eradicate disease were overwhelmingly centered on city slums.
Armus continues: “This process, like many others associated with the arrival and consolidation
of a certain modernity, was bound up in consent and coercion, social imitation and learning,
novelty and tradition.”12 State expansion and modernization in this instance sent public health
and medical professionals to dwellings to help an often-unreceptive lower class. Outdated
sewage systems, lack of potable water, close quarters in multifamily homes where people lived
side-by-side with farm animals—these were singled out as some of the most pressing unsanitary
occurrences in poor neighborhoods.

11

Diego Armus, The Ailing City: Health, Tuberculosis, and Culture in Buenos Aires, 1870-1950
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 346.
12
Ibid., 346.
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Modernizing processes of all kinds—state and legal expansion, social programs, urban
development, disease containment and control, construction of housing and infrastructure—
constituted a multifaceted force for change that bore down on the poorest residents of urban
slums in Latin America. Informal workers, the working class, agricultural laborers, and
increasingly religious leaders, the middle class, and politicians, centered efforts on housing and
the plethora of issues closely related to it. Urban poverty was frequently treated as an
emergency, even when it was not the result of natural disasters like earthquakes, or war
displacement. The crisis of urban poverty ultimately demanded state intervention, accompanied
by significant foreign financial backing.

16

Chapter 2: Structures of Chilean Society
Class, Economy, and Urbanization
The twentieth-century Chilean experience with slums is necessarily informed by Chile’s
geography and socioeconomic development. The narrow strip beyond the Andes was remote in
colonial times. The provincial capital of Santiago, founded in 1541 by Pedro de Valdivia, sat at
the center of a region relegated to feeding the other parts of the Spanish empire.13 An elite group
of Spanish immigrants exploited a small indigenous peasant population.
This dynamic did not drastically change with independence from Spain. The latifundia
system of large estates employing semi-peon laborers dominated Chilean agriculture in the
nineteenth century, and lasted in rural regions well into the twentieth century. By the end of the
1930s, and despite various reform and redistribution efforts, most useful land remained in the
hands of a few: between 1935 and 1936 an estimated tiny elite-owned 626 estates constituted
57.73 percent of all arable land.14 Monteón notes that many of the families who controlled Chile
in 1963 were related to those who sat atop the colony in 1800.15 The Larraín family, for
example, epitomized these Spanish-descended aristocrats.16 The same can be said for Chilean
cities, as “… in the early nineteenth century, the ruling clique in Santiago could not have
included more than fifty or sixty families…”17 Zeitlin and Radcliff describe the ruling class as

Fernando Pérez Oyarzún and José Rosas Vera, “Cities within the City: Urban and
Architectural Transfers in Santiago de Chile, 1840-1940,” in Planning Latin America’s Capital
Cities, 1850-1950, ed. Arturo Almandoz (London: Routledge, 2002), 110.
14
Thomas C. Wright, Landlords and Reform in Chile: The Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura,
1919-1940 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 125, see Table 15.
15
Michael Monteón, Chile and the Great Depression: The Politics of Underdevelopment, 19271948 (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1998), 4.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
17
13

having indistinguishable economic and family interests.18 They were, in fact “… simultaneously
‘capitalist’ and ‘landlord,’ [and] integrated into particular clusters of multiply intermarried
propertied families…”19 This ruling elite maintained disproportionate control, as many Chilean
political parties and organizations were essentially extensions of the ruling class.
Most Chileans were part of the underclass of inquilinos, or tenant farmers. Before the
colossal migrations hit critical mass, these people had little economic opportunity or prospects of
rising out of deep indebtedness to large landowners. Rural folk were expected to grow their own
food and extra wheat to sell and pay other expenses, as well as provide wheat for the landowner,
though there was rarely enough land left over to make this feasible. People worked in exchange
for regalías (derived from the word gift), which included housing, food, a small plot of land, and
other necessities provided by the old aristocratic families. The inquilinos received some cash
payment, but as late as the 1950s as much as 70 percent of their income was received as
regalías.20 In something akin to sharecropping, the inquilinos owed the landowners a large
portion of the crops produced on their farm.21 Furthermore, the small farmers were required to
hire seasonal workers out of their own pockets.22 The market was already flooded with the
product of the large landowners (also grown with the labor of the inquilinos) and cheaper
imported goods, so the common farmers could not compete given their small operations.
Chile may have been a frontier under Spanish control, but after independence the global
market reflected international business interests. The Chilean wheat industry produced massive
18

Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Radcliff, Landlords & Capitalists: The Dominant Class of
Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 7.
19
Ibid., 9.
20
Ibid., 21.
21
Ibid., 22.
22
Ibid., 22-23.
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quantities to feed overseas nations like the U.S. and Australia. Apart from agriculture, the pillars
of the Chilean economy became the production and export of copper and nitrates (saltpeter),23
industries that were predominantly foreign-owned.24 The wealth that was generated from the
nitrates industry in its heyday reverberated throughout Chilean society, sparking unprecedented
industry, commerce, migration, and construction.25 Copper remained economically paramount in
Chile throughout most of the twentieth century; however, in an often-volatile world market the
nation was destined to face insecurity when selling its major product, which eventually became
overwhelmingly U.S.-controlled. In contrast, however, the nitrate industry only sustained the
nation into the beginning of the twentieth century, as it collapsed during the Great Depression.
Chile’s urbanization patterns and its construction of infrastructure aligned with its
geography and industries. The nation’s elongated and narrow geography required that wealth
and transportation be concentrated around the Central Valley.26 The nitrate era saw some export
activity out of ports in the north, but for the most part all movement of natural resources, food,
and products was slated for a circumscribed path that led first to Santiago, and then out the port

23

Nitrates were in demand on the international market not only for their value as a fertilizer, but
also as a key component in munitions, see Michael Monteón, Chile in the Nitrate Era: The
Evolution of Economic Dependence, 1880-1930 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1982), xii.
24
The annexation of the Antofagasta region at the very northern tip of Chile, acquired with
victory in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) fought against Peru and Bolivia, incorporated
territory rich in nitrates, initiating the nitrate era.
25
As DeShazo writes: “This development of industrialization, and infrastructure required
manpower. The country remained in a state of great demographic flux for the next fifty years, as
agricultural workers of the Central Valley gravitated to the mining camps and ports of the North
and to the fast-growing cities of Santiago and Valparaíso,” Peter DeShazo, Urban Workers and
Labor Unions in Chile 1902-1927 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 3.
26
Jon V. Kofas, The Sword of Damocles: U.S. Financial Hegemony in Colombia and Chile,
1950-1970 (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 91.
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of Valparaíso.27 The material conditions of the country and its geographical layout, the location
of its economic foundations, the motives of owners, and the structure of Chilean society all
suggested that a high rate of migration would inevitably yield an urban housing crisis.
An itinerant labor force staffed the first railroads, mines, construction sites, and ports
necessary for urbanization. Many of the first urban migrants were these seasonal workers who
floated from job to job, and who worked the labor-intensive phase of the wheat harvest. They
filled many careers that would gain influence as the century wore on, such as railcar operator or
dockworker. These laborers became the backbone of Chilean modernization and urbanization, as
the floating seasonal workforce found opportunities at first in the mining boomtowns and ports,
but increasingly primarily in the capital and Valparaíso.28
Families and single men fled the mines at the northern end of the country and the
beleaguered wheat farms in the thousands for the cities of the central region.29 The SantiagoValparaíso region became one of the only viable destinations for those seeking jobs. The
country’s transition from rural to urban in character was the result of these two cities’ booming
population growth.

27

Valparaíso developed in parallel to the California Gold Rush, as before the building of the
Panama Canal ships were forced to sail around the entire South American continent. The port
city often accommodated travelers from places like San Francisco, and in turn some U.S.
architects and planners made their way south through this connection.
28
Ibid.; DeShazo vividly describes how the rural workforce came to form the basis of the “peóngañán segment of the Chilean urban working class.” He concludes: “A peón-gañán could move
quickly from one task to another, from city to harvest to mine and back again. As time passed,
many took up more permanent work,” see DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile,
5.
29
For example, in August of 1914 South Pacific Mail reported 2,000 unemployed families
flooded into the capital, most having fled the dying industry in the nitrate fields, see Walter,
Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 60.
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Table 2.1. Population totals in and net migrations to Santiago and Valparaíso

(Sources: Markos J. Mamalakis, Historical Statistics of Chile: Demography and Labor Force, Volume 2;
R. Paul Shaw, Land Tenure and the Rural Exodus in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru; Peter
DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile.)

Table 2.2. Urbanization of Chile

(Source: Mamalakis, Historical Statistics of Chile)

Ranchos and Conventillos: Evolution of Chilean Shanties and Slum Tenements
The first wave of migrants to Santiago crowded into makeshift shantytowns along the
Mapocho River, initially dubbed ranchos. The outskirts of Santiago became populated with
women who carried with them their rural tendencies, combining domestic agriculture, cottage

21

industries, and small commerce out of their shacks to stay afloat on the edge of the city.30 Yet
these women were consistently stigmatized for this industriousness. Women and children were
some of the earliest migrants to cities, as an underclass of women was necessary for urban
lifethe aristocrats and developing middle class desired domestic workers, such as nannies and
maids.31 The ranchos were the roots of the pobladores that would become famous by the 1960s
and 70s. To the elite these presented a repulsive juxtaposition to the grandiose beaux arts style
of the city’s center, which they described using dreadful racist languagethe visible poverty,
after all, clashed with the perceived sophistication of the central Alameda and the Mint.32 The
rich and middle class wished to avoid embarrassment with European visitors, who were troubled
by the normal homelessness, begging, and lack of open public space.33 Despite efforts to
eradicate them, the shacks were a persistent city sight in the early decades of the twentieth
century. They extended up into the hills surrounding Valparaíso and circled downtown Santiago
in nearly every direction but the northeast.

30

Elizabeth Quay Hutchinson, Labors Appropriate to Their Sex: Gender, Labor, and Politics in
Urban Chile, 1900-1930 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 5.
31
Ibid.
32
A smallpox outbreak had devastated Santiago’s conventillos (tenements) and arrabales (lowincome neighborhoods composed of Arab immigrants) in 1871, prompting the demolition of
unsanitary dwellings and leaving their residents packing for the even further off-the-grid
rancherías along the river. The rich went as far as to label these people “barbaric African
hordes,” see Murphy, For a Proper Home, 45
33
A publication by Albert Masch in Geneva documented his trip to Santiago between 1904 and
1906, where he witnessed 200,000 rotos or “broken ones” in the city slums, see Walter, Politics
and Urban Growth in Santiago, 18.
22

Table 2.3. Conventillos in Santiago

(Sources: DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 57; González Arriagada, “Surviving in
the City,” 87)

Figure 2.1. Conventillo as depicted by Karl Brunner in 1939 (Source: Karl Brunner, Manual de
Urbanismo Volume 1 [New York: Routledge, 2016], 262)
Conventillos, tenement style multi-family housing, offered only minimally improved
living conditions to the ranchos. Most of the conventillos were a residue of Santiago’s not-sodistant agricultural past, repurposed buildings, such as grain warehouses and the like, typically
23

one or two-story buildings “…with a single door on the street opening into a square courtyard.”34
Landlords used the shells of old structures and compartmentalized the buildings into apartments
to maximize profit, without consideration for the safety or comfort of the residents. Families
would occupy their own small, dimly-lit room surrounding the courtyard, most lacking a
window, as the window-equipped rooms facing the street commanded the highest rent.35 The
conventillos were extremely susceptible to earthquakes, storms, and other natural disasters, as
they were cheaply and haphazardly constructed.36 The rooms faced internally toward a
communal courtyard, kitchen, and an open sewage canal that ran through the whole complex.
This understandably became acknowledged as a serious health hazard.37 Conventillos also
housed bakeries, storefronts, and farm animals. The courtyards became centers of urban life, as
the practices of rural living had to be adapted to fit in the new availability of space.
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Figure 2.2. Aerial view of Santiago’s conventillos (Source: Brunner, Manual de Urbanismo, 60)
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Figure 2.3. Map of conventillos and cités in Santiago, 1910 (Source: DeShazo, Urban Workers
and Labor Unions in Chile, 58)
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Figure 2.4. Map of conventillos 1900-1923 (Source: Elizabeth Quay Hutchison, Labors
Appropriate to Their Sex: Gender, Labor, and Politics in Urban Chile, 1900-1930 [Durham:
Duke University Press, 2001], 31)
Early in the century large portions of Santiago were entirely composed of shacks,
tenements, and other forms of cheap housing. A 1915 article noted eighty blocks in the
northwest section of the capital as being entirely composed of cités and conventillos.38 Cités—
two or three-room brick apartments clustered in small groupings around a corridor that opened to
the street—were a step above conventillos and were often reserved for city clerks and
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bureaucrats.39 Cités were unavailable to the poorest Chileans but were still demarcated as
substandard.
Table 2.4. Demographic comparison of men and women in Santiago and in conventillos

(Source: Hutchison, Labors Appropriate to Their Sex, 32, 25, see table 1)

Santiago was a city of poor women and their children, who were the most common
occupants of the repurposed conventillos. Men, if employed, often resided in housing provided
by employers. Lucrative men’s occupations were backbreaking and conditions were hazardous,
providing for an appalling mortality rate, and leaving many widows bound for the cheapest
housing available. Furthermore, many men arrived in the earlier migration waves described
above. As rural society further collapsed women and children fled the dire situation. In 1925,
the U.S. ambassador to Chile wrote to Washington disgusted by the conventillos, describing
them as crowded 15 sq. ft. rooms that typically housed families of four, but often as high as eight
individuals.40 The Labor Office estimated a density of about 65.4 people per building.41 People
were sleeping side-by-side in tiny rooms stacked up for several floors. Mothers and their
children were forced to live near unfamiliar and even outright threatening men. In 1918 the High
Council on Housing ordered 1,319 conventillo rooms be torn down.42 Houses built by the
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Santiago Savings Fund in 1919 were meant to be affordable, but proved far out of reach of the
budgets of their intended consumers, the poor.43
Despite the visible abject poverty, by the 1920s the local authorities had formed a new,
albeit unofficial stance on shanties that did not easily harmonize with the goals of professionals
and policy makers—so long as the slums remained out of sight from the city center and other
rich neighborhoods, their residents were left alone. The poor took advantage and camped out in
every nook, such as unoccupied corners between roads and rivers, though most concentrated just
north of the Mapocho River.44 New arrivals from the nitrate fields, on the other hand, received
government-provided shelters called albergues.45 State housing could not tackle the persistent
stream of new arrivals from the north, and many displaced miners and their families did not
manage to duck the slumlord-owned conventillos. Nonetheless, the contrast in government
assistance perpetuated a division between the informal part-time laborers with rural beginnings
and the incoming miners, though the two groups might easily be neighbors sharing a wall or
even a room within the same tenement. From the viewpoint of most groups promoting
industrialization and urbanization, workers displaced from the mines were expected to enter
more worthwhile occupations and in turn fuel the economy.
The Chilean urban population explosion necessitated expanded bureaucracies and distinct
zones, so that tasks and funds could be divvied up. In turn residents were abruptly confronted
with new bureaucratic offices and complex laws. 1906 witnessed the division of Santiago into
nineteen municipalities, which left many residents disconnected from city services and
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infrastructure. Per the MINVU website, twenty-nine new poblaciones were created in the city in
1925, and fourteen in other regions.46 The new neighborhoods of Santiago exploded in
population, a large part of which can be attributed to rancho and conventillo residents.
Table 2.5. Growth of new municipalities of Santiago

(Source: Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 74)

Figure 2.5. Santiago’s neighborhoods in 1938 (Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago,
10)
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In the process of creating municipalities, poor residents were sold fake land titles by
developers, giving them a false sense of security in “phantom subdivisions.”47 Homes were
relegated to no-man’s-land, forgotten between adjacent official zones; most commonly these
were the informal shacks and tents wedged up against a bridge or riverbank. Horror stories were
typical, as residents held onto titles for decades only to discover their paperwork was
meaningless.

Radicalization and Progressivism
Working-class Chileans developed an affinity for unionization and militant actions in the
first few decades of the twentieth century, with much of the struggle rooted in overcrowding and
lack of homes in urban centers. In the early part of the century, strikes, protests, and outright
violent conflict were a common sight in Chile’s major cities. One of the most significant
working class demonstrations took place in 1905 and was deemed “Red Week.” Rising food
prices and a cattle tax mobilized 30,000 to 50,000 people in Santiago to protest peacefully at
first. But this quickly broke down into two days of mob-led destruction and looting aimed at the
wealthy and their property. It proved to be the “…bloodiest uprising in the history of Santiago
before 1973; over 300 persons were killed and at least 1,000 injured.48 Major strikes included
the 1916 railway strike in Santiago, the 1917 general strike in Valparaíso, and the 1918 printing
strike.49
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In 1930s Santiago, students organized armed contingents and engaged in outright gun
battles with the Chilean carabineros or police force.50 The civil unrest in the cities was
overwhelmingly orchestrated by middle sectors, while the participants in the upheavals were
more likely to be artisans, transportation workers, or students, not the homeless.51 Urbanization
entailed pushes for equality and reform, a response to the tremendously concentrated wealth in
the hands of the Chilean upper class. Residents demanded attention from the government to their
basic needs, and they often did so by taking to the streets. Not surprisingly, demonstrations and
clashes with the authorities inevitably extended to the issue of inadequate housing and poor
housing conditions. By 1925, after three years of renter strikes over conventillo conditions in
both Valparaíso and Santiago—they mainly consisted of nitrate workers and their families who
had been moved out of government-provided housing—tenant leagues sprang up throughout the
cities.52 Even formally employed workers and middle-class segments of society were relegated
to substandard homes and neighborhoods. Accustomed to decades of experience voicing gripes
and, if need be, organizing strikes and demonstrations, they naturally continued to put up a fight.
While the city’s poor made their way south and north of downtown in search of
affordable rent, those with enough money fled to the eastern suburbs, to neighborhoods that
remain upper and middle class to this day, like Las Condes and Providencia. A new bureaucracy
and contingent of skilled professionals who made up an incipient middle class began to cohere
within this group of better off urban dwellers. They would be at the forefront of emerging efforts
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to make city life possible.53 Meanwhile elite Chileans from cities and the countryside alike sent
their children abroad or to the universities in Santiago and Valparaíso for education, which they
attained living adjacent to the visible suffering of rapidly mushrooming inadequate housing.
Concern, sympathy, and worry for the workers and underclass took hold among the younger
members of these better off sectors of society as they were exposed to the deplorable living
conditions of the urban poor. In addition, these early members of the Chilean middle and
bureaucratic classes also largely ascribed to a concept of a Chilean ‘people,’ a notion that,
combined with a measure of patriotism or nationalism, shaped a concerted effort to assist the
members of the “Chilean race”. At a more self-interested level, moreover, emerging
professionals were also motivated to address the misery of the poor to preempt that group’s
radicalization and the emergence of civil unrest.
Regardless of the exact motive, Chile’s middle class functioned to convince the unwilling
aristocratic elite to permit reform, in what often amounted to a generational clash. These
professionals became engrossed in “…the ‘social question,’ or the problem of worsening living
and working conditions in the country’s mining centers and major cities, especially Santiago and
the port city of Valparaíso, and the associated proliferation of working-class radicalism.”54 From
this perspective, the middle class was relatively successful in harnessing knowledge centers,
negotiation, the press, and bureaucratic positions to promote their own causes, and in turn
brought the social question to the table on the larger political stage. 55 Middle class elements
turned Chile’s third major party, the Radical Party, towards a moderately center-left direction by
53
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the 1930’s. As the middle class grew along with the demands of urbanization, reform became
increasingly less taboo.

Crisis
By 1930 the economic situation in Chile had worsened tremendously with the Great
Depression. The lower and middle classes were devastated, but even the aristocratic-descended
landlords and urban elite felt the repercussions. The country had managed to amass $140.9
million in debt by 1930.56 Wall Street canceled loans to the country in the wake of the 1929
crash, starving its financial resources. Monteón emphasizes the dire situation, writing: “Families
roamed the countryside subsisting on wild greens. The government put many of the unemployed
in urban warehouses; even then, thousands remained homeless.”57 When Arturo Alessandri
(1932-38) was reelected to a second stint as president of Chile he ran on a platform of economic
nationalism with a semblance of populism, vowing to take the country out of economic crisis.
Between 1933 and 1935, with an aim to reinvigorate the economy with jobs, the government
offered a ten-year tax exemption for all new buildings.58 Policies of this sort yielded immediate
results, as between 1932 and 1935 these incentive programs aided in reducing unemployment
from an estimated 129,000 to 8,000.59 Given these tax breaks, it was considered safest to invest
one’s money in real property, which presented a stable government-subsidized market.
Alessandri resurrected the economy in a manner that not only impressed the elite, but also the
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lower ranks of the population. It is not surprising that his policies fared well across the political
spectrum.
Yet despite their popularity, government policies recommending quick fixes to
accommodate arriving migrants typically foundered. A 1933 article in the publication WIKEN
noted the government’s effort to channel the poor south of Santiago to other provinces while
HOY suggested a “return to the land,” and that the unemployed should be provided with small
agrarian plots.60 Chile passed a law that permitted the president of the republic to allocate poor
families gold-bearing lands and established the Gold Panning Office.61 It was a failure. The
program dumped people in areas completely detached from infrastructure.62 Panning for gold
was brutally exhaustive work, and while 400,000 people were transported to the gold sands in
March, after the dreadful winter only 26,000 remained.63 Efforts like the gold scheme and the
catchy rebranding of rural life are indicative of a shortsighted if not panicked response to social
and economic malaise.
Despite the problems associated with the Great Depression at the close of the 1920s, such
as rising inflation and food prices, feverish construction booms characterized the early 1930s.
However, this was unsustainable, as the faux economic growth was bound to falter without an
industrial base to fuel it. Santiago, and to a lesser extent Valparaíso, were struggling to house
refugees from the failing nitrate fields, and in turn the cities saw an explosion in their slums,
such as the ill-reputed conventillos. Attempts to solve the housing shortages, address disease,
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and recover from disaster would lead to a network of laws and institutions that would prove their
worth in the subsequent decades.
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Chapter 3: Urban Planning and Architecture
Early Influences
In the early twentieth century, Chilean architects were familiar with popular international
trends like embryonic modernism, verticality, and the need for orderly planning based on the
gathering of data.64 Indeed, Chileans had a long history of recruiting foreign architects and other
professionals dating back to the mid-1800s. Instructors came from places like Italy, France,
Spain, and Germany to teach some of the first architecture courses and head some of the first
architecture departments in the Latin American nations.65 This international exchange of
expertise led by the 1920s to optimism in the fields of urban housing, hygiene, and planning,
though solutions were hindered by a lack of resources and an inability to translate ideas into
material actions to address the needs of the common poor.66
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The rapid growth of cities and the prevalence of ranchos and coventillos resulted in the
passage of a rash of housing laws early in the century.67 The series of laws encompassed the
financial as well as physical aspects of construction. These laws also addressed and assisted with
repairs of apartments and houses.68 Laws of this period highlighted two main phenomena:
“arrendamiento a piso” and “huerto obrero.”69 “Arrendamiento a piso” (roughly translated to
“lease a floor”) referred to a housing option for a family with scarce resources who intended to
further build a partially complete home as the family members saved up. The “huertos obreros”
(workers’ gardens or orchards), in contrast, were plots that were utilized as both home and
income generators, through the establishment of small agriculture, industry, a market, etc. These
houses were erected “…in the middle of economic opportunities.”70 As Hidalgo Dattwyler
writes: “In these conventillos there were people in coexistence with birds, pigs, horses, in
addition to the fleas, bedbugs, cockroaches, and lice that they house.”71
A 1935 law stipulated that the President could issue plots in the name of the Housing
Department, designated as “las mejoras,” which referred to the above mentioned arrendamiento
a piso, where the tenants would effectively improve their lot over time via self-help efforts or
their own labor.72 Under this law the President regulated prices and guaranteed titles.
“Compraventa de sitios a plazo” (trading of term sites), allowed people with faulty documents to
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trade in for official papers.73 Through this law arrendamientos a piso were issued in 115
different poblaciones. Another 18,682 official leases on plots were allotted.74
In total, between 1906 and 1925, housing laws, despite flaws, made a dent in the housing
shortage: the laws of this early period resulted in demolishing 15,147 homes and constructing
97,782.75 But these early approaches to housing overall favored the burgeoning middle class and
ultimately amounted to a surface-level patch on a deep wound. Around the time Santiago was
being divided along neighborhood lines it also constructed its first public housing. A series of
fledgling programs constructed homes and neighborhoods, providing a foundation later for more
impactful projects. Santiago built its first two public housing projects in 1911: the Población
Huemul south of the Alameda, and the Población Eugenio west of the Club Hípico (Polo Club).76
The mass influx of desperate nitrate miners in the 1930s transformed the city, as the local
government accelerated its construction of public works to meet pressing demands. Oscar
Prager, for example, designed the Parque Bustamante, also known as Gran Bretaña, in an
Austrian style on land reclaimed from the river,77 while Guillermo Schneider produced housing
complexes in the 1930s intended to replace the conventillos and citésthese included the
TURRI and Plaza Blaquedano apartments.78 These projects however only housed a few hundred
families. They would characterize much of Chile’s experience in attempting to provide public
73
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housing for the urban poor—often aspirational and well-meaning, but ultimately inadequate over
time.
The confidence placed in planners in this period by the government was impressive,
though overly optimistic given the insufficiency of financial backing. There were repeated failed
attempts at implementing plans for Santiago in the 1920s and 30s modeled after European
cities.79 Grandiose visions for the city were dreamed up, but in practice small-scale solutions
proved more attainable and cost efficient.
The city underwent significant additions and re-orderings, but this was at the expense of
several rejected regional plan proposals. In 1922 a plano de la manzana transformada
materialized on land purchased next to the famous San Francisco Church.80 Manzanas are city
blocks cut internally and usually diagonally by alleys and public spaces.81 Santiago acquired a
European aesthetic and feel through its connections to Spanish and Austrian planners. These
internally cut units of buildings were intended to provide the charm of small streets and alleys;
the manzanas also resembled the organically developed layout of conventillos, facing inward
toward a central public space, now a street, alley, or park.82
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Yet, slum conditions persisted and even worsened despite social programs and the
dedication of professionals to their eradication. In the late 1920s it was estimated that Chile had
the highest infant mortality rate in all Latin America, as “…by 1928 one in four (as compared
with one in three at the beginning of the century) live births in Santiago ended in death before the
first year of life was completed.”83 In the same year renowned planner Carlos Carvajal
concluded that 40 percent of Santiago, 192,000 people, lived in some 8,000 unsanitary
buildings.84 “Unsanitary” was a blanket label for any homes that defied ideal standards,
including features like dirty drinking water, open sewage, or lack of streetlights and pavement.
Near the end of 1928, the Ministry of Interior required local governments to provide lighting and
pavement for barrios populares, adding to the multifaceted effort to improve health and
mortality rates that extended beyond the construction of homes. Addressing the atrocious infant
mortality rate necessitated this combination of solutions, improving each family’s individual
household while simultaneously illuminating the sidewalk to create a safer walk home or
educating people to refrain from sleeping near their livestock or dumping their dirty water out
the window.
Chileans used their familiarity with slums when engaging with other technical experts
internationally, communicating their optimism about solving an intractable shortage.85
Conferences held in Santiago invited architects and planners from throughout Latin America and
the world to witness the progress made in solving the problem, as well as to contribute advice.
83
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For instance, the Pan-American Conferences on Architecture and Urbanism brought together
professionals throughout the region to collaborate and debate.86 At the first of the congresses,
held in Santiago in 1923, it was agreed that it was the “…’primordial duty’ of the state to provide
citizens with cheap, healthy habitation.”87 Chilean architects took this ideal to heart and by 1923
the Chilean Association of Architects was vocally committed to solving the housing crisis along
the standards for minimum dwelling established at the Brussels CIAM conference.88 Six years
later in 1929 the Public Works Department had committed to the “science of urbanismo,” a
popular concept with visiting planners, embracing planning as a necessary component of any
social housing or hygiene program.89 At times, it was even viewed as a panacea, as if a neat
neighborhood alone could somehow inspire poor residents to pull themselves out of poverty
without financial assistance or job opportunities.
Natural disasters provoked changes in policy and drove Chileans into emergency relief
efforts; for the poor, natural disasters equated to displacement, homelessness, and at times even
lethal conditions due to a landlord skimping on safety or the limits of a self-built home.
Earthquakes certainly quickened migrations. Pressured into action, the Chilean government
created a series of disaster relief measures and institutions that became useful tools in the
struggle for housing. The 1928 earthquake in Talca furthered burgeoning interest in codifying
planning principals, as a 1931 law generated in the wake of the tragedy required that “…every
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city with a population over 20,000 must develop a General Transformation Plan.”90 The law also
established national urban standards, for example, for the widths of streets and the heights of
homes.91 The Central Board gestated by this law was rebranded in 1936 as the Popular Housing
Fund or CORHABIT. It offered housing loans with twenty-seven-year terms and initial
payments on mortgages.92
Displacement and homeless caused by earthquakes and the crash of industries, as well as
urban crowding more generally, created an ideal context for the adoption of foreign models of
planning and affordable housing. Reconstruction of damaged regions and a slum crisis nurtured
experimentation. A Chilean affinity for city planning developed early in the twentieth century,
and pieces of European schools of thought were sensibly adopted. Linear Planning and
urbanismo were incorporated into courses taught in Chilean universities, borrowing from
Spaniard Arturo Soria y Mata and Austrian Camillo Sitte.93 Chileans were aware of the
modernist movement—for example, upon graduating from the Universidad Católica in 1928,
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Sergio Larraín García-Moreno toured Europe, working with architects including Le Corbusier,94
and in 1929 Larraín, who had returned to Santiago, with Jorge Arteaga designed the Oberpauer
building in a distinctly Bauhaus aesthetic.95 That being said, in the 1930s and 40s Chilean
planners took an alternative route to that of the modernists, instead looking to another Austrian
for influence, Karl Brunner, possibly because professionals had already cultivated a deep
admiration for and sense of comfort with planners like Sitte.96 Brunner’s impact on Chilean
planning proved to be long lasting; his efforts primed the country to promote social housing over
the next few decades.
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Figure 3.1. Oberpauer Building (Source: Fernando Pérez Oyarzún, “Chile,” Latin America in
Construction 1955-1980 [New York: MoMa, 2015], 158)
Karl Brunner, the Austrian Planner
Karl Brunner von Lehenstein was officially invited by the Chilean president in 1929 to
reconstruct post-earthquake Talcaat the height of urban migrations caused by the
reverberations of the Great Depression. 97 Disaster and economic turmoil yielded innovation and
a desire for order. For Brunner, this was an opportunity to showcase the value of his techniques.
In 1929 he published the influential Santiago de Chile: su Estado Actual y Futura Formación
(Santiago de Chile: A Study for Future Expansion).98 Brunner stayed in Santiago until 1932 and
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returned in 1934,99 working with Chilean notables who would carry on his legacy long after his
departure.100 His ideas were categorically influential in Chilean urban planning, including in
dealing with the ever-present problem of housing the poor. In Brunner’s vision for Santiago, the
hygienic crisis in the conventillos could only be solved through a thought-out response to
population growth. The task of planners was to craft a set of standardized policies and orderly
infrastructure and plots to receive and guide urban newcomers. To an extent his ideas
corroborated and continued many of the practices that were already in play within Chile.

Figure 3.2. Karl Brunner in 1931 (Source: Höffer, “El origen de la metrópolis,” 1)
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Brunner famously held a bitter dislike for the work of Le Corbusier, but shared common
threads with the modernists and other schools of planning. On October 29th and November 14th,
1929, Brunner outlined his urban planning theories in a series of lectures at the Universidad de
Chile, titled “Problemas actuales de urbanizacion” (Current Problems of Urbanization).
Brunner began by explaining that town planning in its modern incarnation required consideration
for both the aesthetic and the scientific. Urbanismo focused on three components necessary to
planning cities: first a human element, meaning culture, social hygiene, and economic and
political contexts; second, a technical engineering aspect; and third, an artistic component.101 All
three parts required equal attention.
Brunner called for something akin to zoning, what he called “a separation of sectors”
each designated for business, public buildings, residences, industry, etc. Each of these sectors
were to be “…separated from the other through open spaces with vegetation, spaces that must
connect the city centre with the countryside.”102 He described what was essentially a circular or
radial city: “The city’s central nucleus… is encircled by residential barrios surrounded by strips
of gardens and parks…”103 Brunner suggested the widening of streets and the preservation of
public monuments and historic buildings.104 One can note the parallels, whether it be to Le
Corbusier’s call for green space, or the Garden City Movement’s and Frank Lloyd Wright’s
desire to marry town and country. Brunner’s thoughts on green space, preservation of historic
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charm, zoning, and especially hygienic precautions all meshed well with the Chilean experience
with planning and neighborhood development up to this point, and was adopted without protest.
Brunner employed examples of Austrian and German cities to communicate his ideas on
social housing and verticality to the Spanish-speaking audience that was consuming his planning
guide. He professed of Vienna: “It is a recognized fact that the way housing is built for the mass
is an essential element for the general aspect of the city.”105 Brunner acknowledged the unique
political context in the city of Vienna—that of a socialist majority in the municipality—and that
its public housing could be irrelevant to other cities like Santiago.106 He particularly took issue
with the height of Viennese apartments: “All the skyscrapers of the Vienna Municipality lack
lifts so dwellers every day have to go up and down the seven or nine floors afoot…”107 Brunner
pointed to a “two-thousand housing-unit project” he was commissioned to do in that city, and to
lessons learned from his experience. He admitted the large buildings made possible a great range
of apartment sizes and layouts, and that in turn he could experiment with methods of providing
natural light.108 However, Brunner maintained that this taller and wider building design did not
work well in the Chilean context.
German cities, in Brunner’s view, provided better models for Chile and other Latin
American countries. The guarantee of public green space, curvilinear streets, shorter buildings,
and more sunlight made the German model more applicable to the dire housing situation in
Chile. He observed: “Exemplars of new style working-class housing are to be found in German
cities where entire districts have been subject to uniform planning and are provided with wide
105
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meadows between the building blocks.”109 The apartments he had in mind were about two to
four stories tall. The Chilean situation resembled that in Germany, in that the German state also
provided very reasonable interest rates to new homeowners.110 Middle and working-class people
would hypothetically prefer a three or four-story building instead of one close to ten if given the
option.
North American skyscrapers, according to Brunner, tended to block out sunlight and
prevent open air spaces with homogeneous rows of tall buildings, which in turn necessitated the
extreme widening of streets.111 The staggering of upper floors inward he thought to be at least a
partial solution for the problems of lack of sunlight.112 Skyscrapers were to be built sparingly
only in locations where they genuinely improved the skyline.113 Brunner used Rio de Janeiro as
an example of the problems with verticality, as in the Copacabana region: “It almost seems as if
the eight- to twelve-storey houses were intended to hide the view of this barrio of huts [favelas]
from the beach, but unfortunately the vista of the hills is thereby covered too.”114 This cosmetic
solution was unacceptable in Brunner’s eyes. Verticality masked the true poverty and frequently
caused more problems than it solved.
Brunner was perhaps most concerned with the layout of streets and the flow of traffic.
He was optimistic for a future in which transportation technology continued to develop at a
remarkable pace. He speculated that city streets would soon become two or three stories tall.115
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The capital was not quite ready for this type of forward-looking constructionhistoric Santiago
had its own beauty that deserved preserving and celebratingthough Brunner presciently
recognized that the explosive urbanization would only continue for Santiago and that the city
would be forced to adapt. He declared Santiago to be in a “happy situation,” where the Alameda
and other planned streets could serve as exemplars, though Brunner stressed “…the visitor will
have to recognize that, in a few decades, this street will become an important road of transit and
will have to carry the traffic for the barrios that will arise here in the future.116 The colonial grid
was considered an impediment to desired radial avenues, though it had some advantages when it
came to the subdivision of blocks.117 Santiago was equipped with other features Brunner viewed
as promising for its oncoming explosive urbanization. In a few decades, the city would be
unrecognizable, and its planners would have to be willing to react quickly and decisively. All
they could do was prepare the best they could for the inevitable.
Several parks, public spaces, and avenues would have to be extended and modified, and
much of the transformations would take place in the popular barrios.118 Santiago, suggested
Brunner, shared the flexibility of war-torn European cities, and would have no trouble adjusting
plots and building blocks, thus assisting the process to “…sanitize insalubrious or dilapidated
barrios…”119 State-sanctioned programs under Brunner targeted certain roads and parks exactly
because squatters had traditionally camped out in those locations. He found Santiago’s
numerous hills advantageous for this purpose as vantage points.120 Part of Brunner’s plan
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involved the expectation that working and middle-class families would build their own gardens
in the style of the English and Dutch, much as many had already done at the foot of San
Cristóbal hill.121 The state had been broadcasting mixed messages, in the past scolding people
for making alternative use of their living spaces, and now endorsing it. Brunner addressed
Santiago with the macro-management role stereotypically desired by many planners, sitting atop
the city’s hills imagining the future, and marking out entire sections of slums to be cleared out
and replaced.

Advancing Modernism
Brunner advised the Second Congress of City Mayors in 1931, where he showcased his
Urbanism and Industrial Progress Exhibition.122 At this meeting Chilean officials feverishly
debated how best to solve the housing crisis, and it would inadvertently expose several overt
flaws in the Austrian’s teachings. Senator Lira Infante suggested that an institution semiindependent of the government could create 166,000 homes in three years, but Luis Muñoz
Maluschka, a student of Brunner, challenged this, declaring that at that rate they would never
make ground on the shortage of 370,000, as estimated by the Architect’s Association.123 Muñoz
posited that the solution lay in planning, that housing responsibilities should be completely
turned over to private sources, and that light material houses should be placed directly on the lots
of former conventillos, with preference given to wage earners of at least 20 pesos a day.124 Many
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of the principles learned from Brunner thus would exacerbate the situation, as here the talk of
minimum earning credentials for social housing could only perpetuate the gap between classes of
city dwellers.
At first experimentation with taller buildings was exclusive to designers of office and
government buildings, but this vertical approach would eventually be applied to apartments.
Chileans dotted the skyline of their capital city with tall skyscrapers in the early part of the
century; for example, the triangular Ariztía Building (1921) and the eleven-story ErrázurizSimpson office building (1924), which with its additional four-story tower was to be the tallest in
South America at the time.125 The vertical growth of Santiago was frequently met with the
sound of protests, as middle-class people worried their views would be blocked and their green
space jeopardized. Brunner’s 1933 plan for Santiago advised against excessive building of
skyscrapers, advocating for a revitalization of the city center.126 Nonetheless, the construction
continued unabated, partially due to policies that incentivized foreigners investing in
construction to dodge high taxes.127
Brunner dominated Chile’s planning scene, though some modernist works began to
percolate through the barriers. The Ministry of Finance Building completed in 1933 was
acknowledged as distinctly Corbusian in style.128 In 1934 Brunner returned to Chile and
produced his influential “Santiago: Study of the Regulatory Plan of the Central District of the
City.”129 He organized a local team, headed by Roberto Humeres, Chief of Urbanism, which
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drew up the definitive “Official Plan for the Urbanization of the Municipality of Santiago,”
eventually approved in 1939.130 That same year, following the 1939 earthquake that devastated
both Chillán and Concepción, Le Courbusier tried, but failed, to obtain a commission to generate
plans for Santiago and other Chilean cities, given that it was met with strenuous objection of
Brunner’s disciples.131

Brunner’s Manual de Urbanismo
In 1939 Brunner was working in Bogotá, where he published his Manual de Urbanismo,
in which he drew heavily on his prior Chilean experiences. He was saliently aware of the
limitations Chilean governments endured, and he detailed them in this volume. Brunner wrote:
“Rudolfo Oyarzún Ph., the renowned Chilean urban planner, speaking recently, of urban
problems today, spoke about the phenomena and prejudices of urban speculation…132 Brunner
then went on to directly quote Oyarzún: “’Thus it is not difficult to comprehend that no
government or municipality has the sufficient economic capacity to finance any path in which
the expropriations should be based on these speculative valuations.’”133 In the 1930s, the
General Commissary of Subsistence and Prices, composed of lawyers, decided it was necessary
to impede housing speculation, but the intervention ultimately failed to have an impact.134
Brunner and Oyarzún acknowledged that the speculative process often dictated the exclusion of
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the most marginalized persons. Still, planners did not abandon their approaches from the prior
decade.
Brunner’s Manual employed the “South American conventillo” as an archetype for other
slums throughout the world, suggesting that the solution was, of course, planning and slum
clearance. He described the conventillos as extremely congested in comparison to Central
Europe, where residents lived in apartments of five to eight stories--in South America, the same
number of occupants would be crowded into one-story apartments.135 He noted that slums were
not only located in downtown areas: “There are other sectors further removed from the
commercial center… Although the land is cheap, in these regions transformation does not
happen automatically as they are not attractive to distinguished people.136” Brunner’s solution to
these distant off-the-grid slums, as might be expected by now, was efficient planning. He
continued: “These sectors can only sanitize and transform themselves through a total
reconstruction, through an effective and well-organized official action.”137 Brunner celebrated
Chile’s long history of housing programs as exemplary efforts to be mimicked, making specific
note of the Urbanism section of the Public Works Department, CORHABIT, and architects like
Muñoz.138 Brunner admitted that relocating slum dwellers was a difficult task (not to mention
one that had not been achieved in his decade of work in Chile), but he perceived it to be the only
solution, as well as one other regions should emulate.
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CORHABIT
Muñoz, with the Architecture Department of the General Works Office in the 1930s,
organized the Affordable Housing Exhibition in 1936, which resulted in the formation of the
National Housing Plan.139 This Exposition focused on the Linear City, as championed by
participant Carlos Carvajal who insisted that linear planning could solve the problem with the
huertos obreros.140 Muñoz recommended that adobe structures replace the ranchos, so that they
would be resistant to fires.141 It was agreed upon at the 1936 Affordable Housing Exposition
that: 1. A third of the country lacked adequate housing. 2. This totaled some 1,500,000 people.
3. 300,000 new hygienic homes would need to be built. 4. It would cost between 2 and 3 billion
escudos. 5. The plan should be passed on to the “financiers” of the Superior Council and Law of
the Popular Housing Fund.142 Chilean professionals documented the shortage and reported it to
those who controlled the purse strings.
The Popular Housing Fund or CORHABIT was fashioned in 1936 to assist with the
above noted financial shortcomings attributed to state-sponsored housing.143 It was anticipated
that it would supply one billion escudos for 166,000 houses at a median value of 15,000 escudos.

Valenzuela, “Mass housing and urbanization,” 274; Collins, “Linear Planning throughout the
World,” 84.
140
The modernist Enrique Gebhard also contributed to the conference, with his article
“Urbanismo y Estadistica” (Urbanism and Statistics) stressing the 25,000 living in 3,000
conventillos in the city of Santiago. Muñoz himself estimated some 250,000 unhealthy homes
needed to be replaced, and 120,000 new homes were needed. In total 370,000 houses, 37,000
per year for ten years, needed to be constructed, see Ibid., 96.
141
Ibid.
142
Ibid., 95.
143
This was Ley 5950 of 1936, championed by the Senator Alejandro Lira Infante, see Ibid., 99;
see Appendix C: Timeline of Housing Laws.
55
139

With five people per family, the program was to benefit some 333,000 people.144 One of the few
organizations to oppose the organization was the Property Owners’ Association of Chile. The
group suggested that the state was far too forgiving with late payments, and that in combination
with low interest rates, CORHABIT presented a competitor with an unfair advantage.145
CORHABIT projects included the Población Vivaceta, housing 600 families at a rent of between
170 and 300 pesos, and the Población Montt located adjacent to the Yarur cotton mill.146 Montt
must have been placed strategically to handle these mill workers, as owner Juan Yarur only
provided about 10 percent of his employees with company housing, and was notorious for
leaving employees bound for the conventillos.147 Apart from groups representing the interests of
property owners, most Chileans saw this as a reasonable step in achieving the type of housing
they had been fighting to obtain.
Foreigners showered the Chilean programs with praise, but this meant little for the
average slum dweller. Francis Violich, the famed planning professor at UC Berkeley and expert
on Latin American cities, heralded CORHABIT as the best housing program in all Latin
America.148 But in 1937, a study found that a twenty-nine-block triangle north of Mapocho
Station—between Avenidas Bulnes, Independencia, and Borgoño—was still almost entirely
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composed of conventillos.149 Foreign planners saw a new frontier in the global south where they
could experiment and relay lessons back to their own nations in an almost carefree, adventurist
spirit. This estranged the reader and academic alike from the on-the-ground realities of slum
dwellers. Labeling the Chilean program as “the best in Latin America” relegated the entire
region to an inferior status, as if it were impossible for any Latin American country to become
equal with the civilized western world. The seeds of dependency on the outside for technical
expertise were planted early before the Cold War.
CORHABIT took about seven or eight years to accumulate momentum, as most of the
organization’s homes were constructed in the later part of its existence. Between 1936 and 1952
the semi-independent institution constructed 43,310 homes;150 however, between 1937 and 1941
worker housing laws more generally resulted in the construction of some 9,180 homes, 58
percent sponsored by CORHABIT, and 42 percent created indirectly by the government offering
tax breaks and investing in self-help programs. This was a small fraction of the 3,000 promised
per year by CORHABIT or the 37,000 it projected could be accomplished.151 In 1941 the
president of CORHABIT blamed this failure on a lack of funds, claiming that if properly
equipped the organization could have manufactured 5,000 homes a year.152 CORHABIT would
be reworked in 1943, after which it would become much more effective. There is some truth in
the interpretation that CORHABIT failed chiefly due to financial deficiencies, but the housing
program was also bogged down with ineffective bureaucracies and the drag of nepotism on the
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appointment of heads of departments. Furthermore, the institution was not equipped with the
capability to levy taxes for the money it needed (many would have to be levied against foreign
corporations), and thus, it could never solve its financial issues internally.
In short, Chile’s housing and planning laws unmistakably exhibited the dominant
influence of Brunner in the 1930smost explicitly in the move towards inter-communal plans
and diverse placement of wide streets, recurrently transitioning Spanish grids into radial cities
with curvilinear streets and diagonal arteries. Housing policy evolved meaningfully during the
1930s under his influence, but as argued by María Isabel Pavez, the insurmountable arrival of
additional waves of rural migrants in the 1940s masked the fruits of Brunner’s methods, which
were not made clearly useful until his disciple Muñoz reintroduced his ideas into the 1950s.153
Thus the 1940s, while left-leaning in many ways, saw much of the above outlined progress in
planning and housing policy rendered inapplicable, due to inflation and indebtedness to foreign
lenders. A resurrection of housing construction would have to wait until the 1950s.
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Chapter 4: Ambition and Experimentation in the 1940s
The Popular Front Years
The Popular Front period (1937-41), while brief, greatly impacted the relationship of the
Chilean state and the poor, leaving a lasting effect for decades to come. In this reformist-minded
moment fulltime workerssuch as miners, factory workers and construction workersgained
political leverage and access to government resources that lasted into the 1950s and 60s. Radical
leftist parties were rewarded for their persistence with government offices, though opportunist
heads of state were repeatedly retired, having promised much and delivered little. Membership
in unions and labor syndicates grew impressively, and the same can be said of involvement in
strikes, which reached a zenith in 1946 with over 70,000 people striking illegally.154 Copper
miners benefitted from Popular Front policies most as they received “…state subsidies for
private investment in state jobs, housing, health care, social security, and increases in real
wages.”155 Workers and labor unions, most of all copper miners, were lionized in the public eye
during the 1940s, as political rhetoric unabashedly promoted their struggle. The same cannot be
said for the most marginalized informal workers.
Natural disaster again stifled the state’s ability to fund projects and threw the entire
nation into a panic. An earthquake struck in April 1939, this time in the south in Chillán,
devastating the nearby heavily populated coastal city of Concepción. In January 1940 following
the tragedy the government created the Corporation for Reconstruction and Assistance, and with
it the Corporation of Production and Development or CORFO under Muñoz’s Division of
154
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Urbanism.156 These organizations were tasked with reconstructing earthquake-damaged regions,
and CORFO with promoting industrialization and development more generally. The state could
not abandon the survivors, many of whom were employed in the copper mines and related
industries, the core industry of the Concepción region. These projects necessitated funds the
government did not have, forcing the state to take out loans.
The borrowing and debt accrual of the Popular Front eventually caught up with the
government, triggering inflation. The cost of living nearly doubled in both Santiago and
Valparaíso between 1939 and 1943,157 while nationally it rose from 15 percent between 1940 and
1946, to as high as 84 percent by 1955.158 Higher costs for food (already high due to the lack of
mechanization and inefficiencies in the structure of the Chilean agricultural realm),
transportation, and all consumer staples, fell most heavily on the lower classes. In the late 1940s,
in response to widespread public discontent President González Videla (1946-1948) “…began to
resort to repression, with the result that during his administration the country was in a state of
emergency for nearly half of his term in office.”159
A law in 1941 allowed the president to set aside state funds and directly offer loans to
aspiring homeowners. An estimated 6,000 houses were eventually built through these means.160
Credit institutions were crafted to keep up with Popular Front promises through general lending,
as the chaotic jump in prices spurred widespread chants for bread, a roof, and clothing on the
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streets.161 Houses, however, were not always the primary concern of common people as, for
example, in 1945 in Quinta Normal, when residents harassed developers attempting to convert a
football field into low-income apartments.162
In 1939, the municipal government considered the first Housing Plan completed. It then
implemented a second improved master plan for the larger Santiago region, the Greater
Santiago: Regulatory Study plan based off the sketches of Roberto Humeres.163 At the peak of
the Popular Front years, between 1938 and 1942, CORHABIT built as many as 9,180 homes, 58
percent directly by the institution, and the rest by indirect methods such as requiring factory and
mine owners to provide worker housing, setting up lending institutions for homeowners, or
provision of construction materials.164
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the state embraced new methods of funding the
construction of homes. For example, a 1943 law restructured the way CORHABIT gathered
capital. It dictated that industries set aside five percent of profits for housing workers in addition
to providing tax breaks for the construction of affordable housing.165 Taxes were levied in areas
like inheritance, legacies, and donations.166 The law reinvigorated CORHABIT, though it would
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disintegrate a decade later.167 Between 1944 and 1953 CORHABIT built 35,174 houses, about
80 percent of total production for its entire existence. This amounted to roughly 3,000 homes a
year.168 The lopsided success of this program evidenced that the route to successful social
programs in fact necessitated a reasonably progressive economic foundation.
Sanctioned home construction still lagged far behind the needs of the population. Land
invasions establishing new neighborhoods began as early as 1940, with Población Arenera
acknowledged as the very first.169 The new squatters exhibited an unprecedented fearlessness,
energized by the Popular Front and emerging left-leaning groups. Communists and socialists
gained the trust of slum dwellers. Land invasions like that of La Lengua embodied the
possibilities. As Schneider writes, forces of all sorts combined “…creating an array of popular
grassroots organizations. Under joint Communist/Socialist leadership, Committees for the
Homeless, Committees for Just Rents, Committees for Neighborhood Improvement, and
Committees for Neighborhood health flourished in the poblaciones.”170 Numerous organizations
of this kind thrived into the late 1940s.
These popular efforts had their material effect as the forties wound down. The end of the
1940s and beginning of the 1950s witnessed the construction of thousands of homes of a
noticeably improved quality. The homes built, while impressive in comparison to years past, did
not scale with explosive urbanization and population increases. Although foreign observers like
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Professor Violich once again applauded the success of CORHABIT in 1949,171 in 1947, about 90
percent of Chilean workers lived intermixed with the unemployed in overcrowded dwellings of
all varieties.172 Per the Social Service Department of the Labor General Office, there still existed
32 poblaciones callampas (the mushroom camps that appeared overnight, essentially the new
iteration of ranchos) housing some 4,579 families.173 Between 1906 and 1952 all worker
housing laws combined supplied about 50,000 homes. As has been evidenced here with
institutions like CORHABIT, most of this activity occurred at the tail end of that period. 174

Chilean Modernism
Planners strongly desired order and standardization in the 1940s as they had been primed
to do in the previous decades, and they pursued these goals through careful detailed policy
informed by data collection. The 1944 Ordinance of Urbanization and Affordable Constructions,
for instance, stipulated exact measurement standards for affordable housing: structures were to
be placed on surfaces of between 36 and 100 meters squared, to support a multitude of housing
typologies.175 The law regulated the minimum space between homes, the maximum height of
buildings and number of floors, as well as minimum light and ventilation. Communities were
He suggested Chile’s 18,000 constructed dwellings lead the Latin American pack, with Brazil
at 15,000, Argentina at 7,500, and Venezuela at 5,000, see Valenzuela, “Mass housing and
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required to be linked to potable water, sewage, public lighting, and industrial energy and gas.
Neighborhood designs were required to include communal spaces and sufficient spacing and
density.176 One can note the obvious relationship to earlier ambitions, especially the hygienic
struggles of the 1920s and the fascination with space, sunlight, air, parks, building height etc.
espoused by Brunner.

Figure 4.1. Población Huemul II (Source: Luis Valenzuela, “Mass housing and urbanization: on
the road to modernization in Santiago, Chile, 1930-1960,” Planning Perspectives 23, no. 3
[2008]: 286)
In the 1940s the ambiguous Popular Front populism allowed housing designers to
gravitate toward the social messages of the CIAM architects, not to mention the potential for
cheap construction costs.177 Julio Cordero’s 1943 Población Huemul II typified 1940s
approaches. The complex was designed with principles derived from “rationalist

Hidalgo Dattwyler, “El papel de las leyes de fomento de la edificación obrera,” 102.
The 1940s witnessed the graduation of Chilean modernists who would become immensely
influential in the 1950s and 60s, such as Jorge Aguirre, Alberto Cruz Covarrubias, Fernando
Castillo, Emilio Duhart, and Héctor Valdés, see Fernando Pérez Oyarzún, “Chile, Matter, and
Landscape,” in “Architectures of Latin America,” Harvard Design Magazine 34 (2011): 114.
64
176
177

architecture.”178 The community replaced a rundown glass factory in Santiago and supplied 186
homes in rows of three or four at a density of 826 residents per hectare, all organized into
“manzanas completas” or complete blocks.179 Huemul’s simple boxed design was established as
the norm for apartment complexes in the following decades.

Sert and Wiener
Chileans reached out to foreign modernists in the 1940s such as Le Corbusier’s disciple
Josep Lluís Sert, when a connection was made by a corporation complying with government
housing laws. A series of communications took place in 1945, per the records of New York City
urban planner Paul Lester Wiener.180 The Valparaíso Gas Company contacted he and Sert via
the American Consulate, seeking worker housing in compliance with a 1943 national Chilean
law,181 illustrating the effectiveness of ulterior methods of promoting housing, such as tax
incentives and government policies that promoted self-help construction.
Sert and Wiener officially began a partnership with their Town Planning Associates
(TPA) in 1941, operating out of New York. After working for the Brazilian government in
1943,182 in 1944 the U.S. State Department sponsored three South American lecture tours by
Wiener, where he advocated for a what he called the “Diagram of the Human Environment” and
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“The Human Scale of City Planning,” later incorporated into Le Corbusier’s CIAM “grid.”183
Wiener advocated for a “science of measurement,” whereby fleets of technical experts would be
deployed before plans would be drawn up. Urban planning was to take into consideration “…all
forms of analysis and commentary (public opinion, public authority, specialists, sociologists,
economists, technicians, etc.)…”184 It is uncertain why the Valparaíso Gas Company took an
interest in the two architect/planners; perhaps it was a result of experts attending the lectures or
learning of the TPA’s work in other nations in the region.

The U.S. State Department hired the TPA early in the planning and housing company’s
existence to experiment with relief housing for war-torn Europe, see Timothy Hyde, “Planos,
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Figure 4.2. A TPA prefabricated structure (Source: Josep M Rovira, Jose Lluis Sert: 1901-1983
[Milano: Electra, 2000], 112)
The first letter made clear the company was interested in the TPA’s specialty;
prefabricated homes. These homes would be delivered as packaged modular parts, constructed
out of cheap, durable, lightweight materials, to be assembled on location. The connection was
facilitated by the Foreign Construction Unit at the U.S. Department of Commerce.185 The Gas
Company had very specific requests; it sought houses 20’ by 24’ that could be expanded to 20’
by 36’ with the addition of bedrooms, and that were to be constructed of damp-proof and fireresistant material.186 A Wiener document directly quoted the initial inquiry as reading “…the

The December 1945 document titled “PREFABRICATED HOMES… HOUSES WANTED
FOR CHILE” noted the initial inquiry was addressed to J. Joseph Palmer, Acting Chief, Foreign
Construction Unit, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. as the first to receive a Chilean
letter and notify Wiener and Sert, see Paul Lester Wiener Papers.
186
Ibid.
67
185

country needs urgently 300,000 workmen’s houses and no less than 10,000 yearly, to absorb the
increase of population. We are studying different solutions for our problem and are very much
interested in receiving this information.”187 Wiener presumed the request would open the door to
serving the Chilean country generally rather than simply the Gas Company.
Chileans were testing the water with Sert and Wiener’s TPA, and it is uncertain why the
deal never went through. In a document titled “Chile – Estimate,” Wiener carefully calculated
the costs of the requested houses, and anticipated each “superstructure” would amount to about
$1,250.00.188 It can be assumed this was either too expensive for the Chilean company or that
they found a better option, for the correspondence ended herein 1946 Sert and Wiener moved
on to Peru, where they were commissioned to generate a master plan for the port city of
Chimbote.189 The entire communication evidences a willingness of Chileans in the mid-1940s,
with slightly better funding than previous decades, to search for housing solutions abroad,
including with planners and architects directly connected to Le Corbusier.

Father Lebret
Other planning schools made an impact on Chilean professionals in this era. In 1947, the
same year as CIAM 6 in England, the French Dominican friar Louis-Joseph Lebret, leader of the
Economy and Humanism movement with origins in the early part of the decade, made his first
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trip to Latin America, visiting both Brazil and Uruguay.190 In June, he met with several
members of Chile’s burgeoning “Falange Nacional” movement (the predecessors of the Christian
Democrats) in Montevideo, and created the Latin American Centre of Economy and Humanism
(CLAEH) housed in the Uruguayan capital.191 Between September 7th and 11th he held the
Inter-American Session on Economics and Humanism, which featured fifteen Chilean
representatives.192 In the 1940s, Chileans were traveling abroad to scout out and recruit
professionals.
Lebret’s teachings reiterated the technocratic approach of most other planners who were
popular in Chile at the time. Religious professionals advised the whole region during the
Liberation Theology movement of the 1960s, who did not necessarily view populism, religion,
and science as the least bit mutually exclusive. Lebret’s IRFED (Institute for Research and
Training in Development), founded in 1958, prided itself on a comprehensive curriculum.
Goulet writes that the IRFED required that students “…be acquainted with the assumptions and
methodology of all the major disciplineseconomics, planning, human geography, crosscultural sociology, politics, nutrition, demography, and so on.193 Lebret had students from all
over the globe and established a diversity of tools to reflect this, expanding his curriculum
beyond strictly planning. He preached a humanistic approach to development and planning. He
was immensely influential up until his death in 1966, even sitting as an expert at the famous
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Vatican Council II from 1962 to 1964.194 Lebret was deeply involved in the Christian Liberation
movement. He quoted and saw his work as in conversation with influential thinkers like Marx,
Kropotkin, and Nietzsche.195 Lebret wished to ensure the Church addressed the material realities
of poverty under capitalism or face losing relevance to radicalism. He understood that religion
had to adapt to the needs of the poor, their last remaining bastion of support.
Architecture magazines, authored by the same professionals who headed institutions and
instructed university courses, heavily dictated the character of development efforts. In 1946 the
publication Arquitectura y Construcción which had a close relationship with CORFO and had
been championing the use of earthquake-resistant materials like reinforced concretewarned
that urban decentralization of the population was necessary, as 70 percent of Chile’s people and
industry were centered in the Santiago-Valparaíso axis.196 58.4 percent of Chileans lived in
urban centers in 1950, reinforcing the narrative of inevitable collapse put forward by
Arquitectura y Construcción.197 Brunner’s predictions had become reality; infrastructure could
not handle the strain of urbanization. Professionals, privy to years of data collection, warned of
imminent collapse. In the 1940s, the problems with the centralized urban corridor of the country
were glaringly evident.
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Chapter 5: Steady Progress in the 1950s
Callampas and Campamentos: Locating Lower-income Neighborhoods during Ibáñez
Housing programs continued to advance even as the economy generally swiftly spiraled
downward in the 1950s. Between December 1952 and April 1955, the cost of living rose 207
percent.198 During Carlos Ibáñez del Campo’s second term (1952-58), public transport costs rose
by 50%, while economic growth fell to 2.5%. His government bore down on labor with austerity
measures to combat inflation and generate revenue domestically.199 Anti-inflation policies
motivated popular discontent, such as riots that broke out in the streets of Valparaíso in March
1957 over bus fare hikes.200 Popular dissatisfaction was vocalized more over the severe increase
in the price of commodities like sugar (100 percent increase) and transportation (50 percent) than
the lack of homes, though the housing shortage and the incoming rural migrants remained a
pressing issue.201 Austerity measures were the primary concern for the time being, as people
needed to eat and get to work above all else.
Ibáñez had no qualms about repressing popular upheavals. During his administration, the
demographic spacing of the capital drastically shifted, as class became more polarizing and
pertinent to neighborhood makeup. His administration instituted a strike ban and drastic cuts in
economic assistance to workers in November 1954, a crackdown on students and workers with
the police,202 and even declared martial law, which involved occupying Santiago with thousands
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of troops, a policy that stayed in effect until February 29th 1956.203 The wealthy, seeing crowds
of poor protestors and fearing for their safety, built homes in the hardly settled northeast suburbs
of the city.204 The rich opted for the secluded oft garden-style communities nearer to the foot of
the Andes, rather than the downtown so desired in colonial times. Spatially, cities were divided
by class via organic migration, zoning laws, and financial realities. The rich quickly discovered
which neighborhoods they preferred and took measures to keep the poor out.
The poor expanded their shanties in every direction away from the city core other than
the northeast. Development of poor communities took place in locations like south of
downtown, in territory already composed of conventillos and in rapidly growing lower-class
suburbs like San Miguel. In 1952, the city was approaching 1.5 million inhabitants.205 The first
Chilean housing census of 1952 used the separate specialized terms campamento, poblacion, and
callampa.206 The census found that 36.2 percent of Santiago lived in substandard housing
conditions.207 3,500 were in “conventillos or similar”, and 225,000 in poblaciones and
campamentos.208 Social Service Department listed some 16,502 families lived in
campamentos.209 The squatting problem had only deteriorated, as the poor gravitated towards or
could only afford to illegally camp out. Conventillos were no longer the dominant form of low
income housing; instead many more of the poor found themselves in the tents and shacks of the
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poblaciones, campamentos, and callampas, foreshadowing the tumultuous events of the late
1960s. Physical growth of the city was almost entirely due to shanties and camps.
San Miguel was a persistent problematic thorn that managed to disrupt planning efforts.
Politician Mario Palestro nicknamed the neighborhood the “Independent Republic of San
Miguel,” exaggerating its tendency to defy any outside authority.210 The southern region of
Santiago, which had been owned by the Subercaseaux family in colonial times, had reached
100,000 by the 1950s. Elsey writes: “State projects that relocated squatters from the city’s center
and northern neighborhoods to San Miguel further stretched the municipality’s resources. This
population increase resulted in severe housing shortages keeping the quality of substandard.”211
The municipal government had given up on San Miguel, as the neighborhood was perceived as
entirely beyond regulation or rescue. In a self-defeating strategy, the government relocated any
squatters there and let the people manage themselves.
The shanties were primed for tragedy, as poorly constructed shacks of found materials
could only last so long against natural elements. Crisis in the shacks produced increased land
invasions on unused government property and in the backyards of the landlord-descended rich.
In 1956 a fire raged through the city’s largest callampa, Zanjón de la Aguada in San Miguel
along the river, leaving several thousand stranded.212 The newly homeless were given
emergency shelter in the Municipal Stadium of San Miguel, where they planned the famous La
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Victoria land invasion.213 Women’s committees were heavily involved in land seizures
including La Victoria. These women organized a free medical clinic and prohibited liquor to
preclude sexual and physical abuse.214 In the same year communists and socialists asked
CORHABIT to purchase land for squatters, who would eventually complete payment in rent. 215
La Victoria’s three thousand families, partially organized by the Communist Party’s Committee
of the Homeless, demanded CORVI (the Housing Corporation, discussed below) provide utilities
such as running water.216 Land invasions were not spontaneous land grabs but instead
complicated strategic plans thought out months in advance and executed at the most opportune
time, though at times an occurrence like a fire or earthquake forced immediate action.

CORVI, CORHABIT, and Self-help Programs
Government housing institutions were afforded more capabilities in the 1950s, as policy
makers increased funding and consolidated bureaucracies: 20.4 percent of the national budget
was spent on housing and urban development in 1955, and in the 1960s that number increased to
25 percent.217 CORHABIT was merged into the Urbanism Section in 1953, creating the Housing
Corporation or CORVI, under the guidance of Luis Muñoz Maluschka.218 The same year
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CORVI and CORHABIT partnered under the Urban Planning and Construction Law to develop
a national housing plan, which in the words of Schneider:
…included delivery of finished houses for middle-income groups. It also contemplated
elimination of poblaciones callampas through delivery of plots to be followed by selfbuilt homes for low-income groups. In addition, the program contemplated an important
housing subsidy to help low-income families cover mortgage payments. Ultimately,
however, these subsidies, based on people’s capacity to save, benefitted high- but not
low-income groups.219

Lending programs like that under the Chilean Chamber of Construction or the Chilean State
Bank in 1953 fell into this same pattern of ineffectiveness by subsidizing the wrong
population.220
The poor, in the meantime, could never save enough to meet minimum standards for
loans. The Social Service Department estimated some 32,237 families still lived in
campamentos in 1959.221 An estimated eight percent of Santiago, 150,00 persons, were thought
to be homeless by the end of the decade.222 CORVI and CORHABIT delivered completed
homes to the middle-class people, while the poorest were expected to construct their own with
what little self-help assistance was offered. This approach aligned with a burgeoning capitalist
ideology that took a couple more decades to become fully established in Chile, one that blamed
the poor for their own poverty, as avenues out of poverty were claimed to exist if they were only
willing to work hard enough.

Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, 41.
“Historia del ministerio de urbanismo y vivienda;” The State Bank is likened to the U.S.
institution Fannie May—loans were intended to increase homeownership, and the State Bank
had close connections to both the International Development and Inter-American Development
Banks, see Murphy, For a Proper Home, 62-63.
221
González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 89.
222
Murphy, For a Proper Home, 62; González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 89.
75
219
220

Self-help programs were geared more toward the poor than the middle class. The SelfConstruction and Mutual Aid Program between the Chilean and U.S. governments constructed
close to 3,000 housing units in the 1950s. However, homes were commonly situated along the
banks of rivers and canals, and in turn were completely cut off from basic infrastructure and
public services, as well as susceptible to disaster like flooding.223 Self-help was not a new
concept in Chile, as explored here, however at this moment the practice became increasingly
associated with and directed at the poor. The stigma of residing in the slums carried on when
transferred to (mostly privately funded) self-help homes, as they were placed where ranchos had
traditionally been located. Space held a deep and complex relationship with the past such that
class divisions could not be easily overcome with orderly neighborhood plans and brand new
concrete walls.

Alberto Cruz and 1950s Modernism
In Viña del Mar, Alberto Cruz and his associates at the Architecture Institute of the
Pontifica Universidad Católica de Valparaiso operated ambitiously with the support of
adventurous investors, symbolizing the popularization modernists gained in the 1950s. His work
always centered on the poor. For example, in Achullapa, where Pérez de Arce writes: “The
commission envisioned the creation of a working-class residential zone situated on the plateaus
behind the urban area, following the trend that relegated low-cost workers’ dwellings to the
periphery. Cruz, however, proposed an alternative placement closer to the center and organized
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the dwellings around a boulevard offering easy access to the urban core.”224 Cruz boldly tested
boundaries with the placement of worker housing. He ignored the concerns espoused by the rich
and instead made worker homes the focal point of Viña del Mar; they deserved the beach air and
the convenient transportation most of all. The blank slate on the sea emphasized the advanced
design concepts alive in Chile, as well as the willingness of some, like the Church, to promote
such experimental programs that centered the poor.
University construction fostered change in architecture and planning that made modernist
apartment complexes possible. Bresciana, Valdés, Castillo, and Huidobro designed the
Universidad Técnica del Estado, with a curriculum focused on industry and technology, on parts
of the Quinta Normal park.225 The “Ciudad Universitaria” or university city, built between 1957
and 1962, was a large L shape that included green central courtyards and an adjacent student
housing complex, the Unidad Vecinal Portales.226 As early as the 1930s, college campuses were
constructed in the style of a university city, as was the trend throughout Latin America. These
were self-contained campuses that centralized all facets of student life, linking apartments,
classrooms, cafeterias, etc. through pedestrian courtyards.227 Brunner’s 1931 plan for
Concepción, for instance, included an independent design for the Universidad de Concepción.228
It is not surprising that the contemporary practices were well-received in Chile, as their history
would suggest decades of interest.
Rodrigo Pérez de Arce, “Landscape in Everything: Lessons from the Valparaíso School,” in
“Architectures of Latin America,” Harvard Design Magazine 34 (2011): 193.
225
Fuentes Hernández, “Campus Universitarios en Chile,” 129.
226
Ibid.
227
Between 1929 and 1932, President Ibáñez sent a troop of 26 professors to Europe, where they
ostensibly soaked in contemporary techniques, see Pérez Oyarzún, “Chile,” Latin America in
Construction, 157.
228
Almandoz, “From Urban to Regional Planning in Latin America,” 88.
77
224

Figure 5.1. Brutalist Portales Neighborhood (Source:
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/487303622153047834/)
Architects made clear their devotion to incorporating modernist teachings. A series of
experimental lower-class dwellings were built in Corbusian style, increasingly the norm in the
1940s, 50s, and 60s.229 The shift was organic. The Población Juan Antonio Ríos in Santiago
was at the forefront of this trend, built between the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was composed
of some 5,271 dwellings.230 The 1954 Población Arauco in Santiago presented open green
spaces and sleek staircases. Two-story homes were grouped in “manzanas alargadas” (extended
blocks). The whole complex was composed of 300 homes.231 Chinchorro (1955-56) and Estadio
(1956-57), constructed by the Bresciani Valdés Castillo Huidobro firm, showcased the
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capabilities of the team and reiterated a willingness to create affordable housing.232 The 1955 to
1958 Portales neighborhood was built by the same superstar firm. Liernur describes the
construction: “The most original feature is the continuation of the open-air corridors as raised
passerelles, which created a circulation grid that passes right over the houses…”233 The complex
was composed of 2,000 units and was globally recognized as a brutalist flagship.234 Affordable
housing displayed a distinctly Chilean character by the 1950s, with large complexes constructed
of typically earthquake-resistant concrete with plenty of shade, embodying the spirit of life in the
arid zone between the Pacific and the Andes. These housing complexes ensured the same
qualities desired for decades; clean air, sunlight, community and green space, solid cheap
materials, etc.

CORFO
A 1959 earthquake added to the distressing pattern of tremors reappearing to haunt the
country every decade. President Alessandri was forced to adopt platforms of public expenditure
and increased taxation. Tidal waves wreaked havoc in the Valdivia area with 2.5 million people
affected, as: “Three thousand people perished during this natural disaster, thousands were left
homeless, and the damage to buildings, factories, mines, and the infrastructure was so extensive
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that it required external financial assistance.”235 The IMF advised the Chilean government to
deploy CORFO in the region with a ten-year plan, as well as urging Alessandri to ask congress
for increased taxes.236 Emergency capabilities were bestowed upon the president in such
moments, under the 1958 State Security Act.237 The government mobilized CORFO to address
the crisis of poverty and housing shortages more broadly, beyond the devastated area. This
enabled the expansion of CORFO capabilities, instilling a trust and openness among Chileans for
developmentalist agendas. The Chilean government’s mobilization of CORFO funds legitimized
a technocratic approach to housing and infrastructure.
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Chapter 6: Conflict, Reform, and Housing in the Frei Era
The Alliance for Progress and Expanded U.S. Funding
In the 1960s, the U.S. aimed to influence most social programs and government policies
in Latin America. Social engineering, it was thought, would ensure that the capitalist vision of
modernization would prevail over any alternatives. Financial aid was invested to prevent
popular discontent and any turn toward radicalism. Corporations, charities, and state-sanctioned
and international bodies like the IMF and the World Bank collaborated to influence Latin
American countries thought to be vulnerable to communism.238 Chile was a prime target for
major funding given its affinity for leftism and populism, as well as its role as one of the more
intellectually significant centers of South America.
The 1960 Act of Bogotá and the 1961 Punta del Este Charter set the gears in motion for
what would become the notoriously flawed Alliance for Progress (ALPRO) with the intention of
achieving the above objectives. ALPRO was a vaguely defined web of U.S. financial and
technical assistance programs to Latin America.239 Chile submitted a national plan to the
program immediately.
In the 1960s, the ‘Big 3’ foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie), which had been
investing in Latin America back to the 1920s, promoted and assisted the goals of ALPRO. Slum
238
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clearance and a measure of legal protection were high on their agendas.240 Parmar writes:
“Elitist, technocratic, utilitarian, and ethnocentric, the foundations’ leaders presided over huge
endowments that were aimed at social engineering. Their philosophy was generally practical,
pragmatic, and utilitarian.”241 Their projects channeled a sympathy for the poor while
perpetuating at the same time a U.S.-centric vision of the world scarcely indistinguishable from
Cold War propaganda.
The formation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 1959 augmented the
effectiveness of U.S. aid programs to Latin America.242 In the 1960s the resources and
mechanisms of delivery made possible “…[u]sing U.S. funds, the [IADB] would make loans
across Latin America to help infrastructure projects in transportation, health, and education.”243
Despite immense pressure, Chileans had refused to break relations with the Cubans,
undoubtedly stirring tensions and intensifying U.S. attention to the country.244 Countless
development projects were undertaken in Chile under the auspices of the above funding. The
money had no visible end in the early and mid-1960s, as Chileans acquiesced to ALPRO and the
IMF’s recommendations.245 By 1962 U.S. aid to Chile had reached $200 million. The
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Alessandri government (1958-64) received about $447.7 million in U.S. aid, dwarfing the $69.1
million given to Ibáñez (1952-58),246 and between 1962 and 1969 Chile received $743 million
from U.S. sources.247 Between 1961 and 1971, Chile received the “…highest per capita US aid
in Latin America,” second only to Vietnam globally.248
ALPRO structured the IA-ECOSOC (the Inter-American Economic and Social Council)
to provide technical experts to Latin American countries to conduct studies, for example, to
gather figures as to how many homes each nation was expected to build with the economic
aid.249 Chile’s ten-year plan satisfied ALPRO representatives with its embrace of stringent
planning. The January 1961 ten-year development plan, “…which CORFO economists,
managers, and engineers drafted…” centered on an agenda prescribed by U.S. aid, mostly
focused on electrical power, as well as mechanization of agriculture and industry.250 The plan
internalized ALPRO’s suggested paths to economic growth, promoting housing construction
along with mechanization and electrification.251 The rural sector certainly required
modernization, a fact no Chilean would question: efficiency would produce more grain,
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necessary to all regions of the country, in turn stabilizing what had been sky-high inflation in
agricultural prices.252

Housing Shortages in the 1960s
At the end of the 1950s unemployment had at least doubled in every Chilean city.
Poverty and insufficient housing remained prevalent. The urban housing shortage was an
estimated five times that of rural sectors.253 The country lacked at least 1.5 million homes, with
most of the deficit in Santiago and other cities.254
Table 6.1. Housing shortages in Santiago

(Source: Hidalgo Dattwyler, “La vivienda social en Chile,” 5)

By 1960, Santiago, now a city of 2 million, had physically expanded in area to 20,900
hectares, about three times its 1930 size.255 The United Nations Center for Housing and
Planning considered 25 percent of Santiago neighborhoods to be slums in 1964, and 20 percent
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of Valparaiso’s housing was labeled inadequate.256 The situation gained attention in the U.S; a
1961 article in the New York Times headlined “CHILE SQUATTERS DEMAND HOUSING:
10,000 Homeless Camp on Site of Delayed Project” highlighted the tragedy in Santiago.257 The
piece noted the people had been waiting about five years for homes though they had already paid
deposits, and that four children had died in the harsh cold.258 The article read: “The most
elaborate structures have rickety wooden frames, corrugated roofs held in place by stones, and
sides formed of boards, canvas or blankets. Some squatters have dug into the ground and put dirt
around their tents as protection against the wind and cold.”259 Chileans were depicted as some
poor souls in a far-off land, living in structures U.S. cities had long-abandoned as relics of the
19th century.260

Frei and Housing Initiatives
In 1964 the centrist Christian Democrats, as part of the effort to win workers and sway
them away from the left, renewed attention on the struggles of the poor, as advised by ALPRO.
ALPRO employed what Taffet calls impact projects, propaganda, to help the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) elect Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-70) Frei over the Socialist Party’s
Salvador Allende. U.S. dollars were mobilized to ensure the poor knew Frei and his platform’s
progressive promises.261
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Frei increased spending on housing by 66.3 percent between 1964 and 1967, as well as
on the urban sector more generally by 114.9 percent.262 He proposed, as Oxhorn describes,
“…the construction of 60,000 new homes per year for 6 years… The state would support home
ownership with loans, flexible financing, and subsidies based on wage levels. To ensure new
houses were in viable communities, Frei promised the construction of shopping areas, parks,
theaters, and schools.”263 Frei understood this would not completely solve housing shortages,
but construction was also expected to provide jobs and spark the economy.264 The lower classes
made the Frei victory possible, as they gravitated to his focus on “’…bread-and-butter’ concerns
of the day (jobs, housing, control of inflation, and educational opportunity).”265 The poor were
not necessarily radicalized beyond accepting reformism—most were willing to settle for a decent
wage and an end to the absurdly high costs of living.266
Frei was invested in a wide array of social programs as he wished to preserve his
popularity with the lowest sectors. He encouraged localized organizing, in turn validating
grassroots activism techniques used in the past. Frei’s “Popular Promotion” policy was intended
to encourage the formation of neighborhood councils, mothers’ centers, youth centers, sport
financed efforts to combat Communism. The party already had some roots in the Liberation
Theology movement, when religious figures genuinely took interest in the struggles of the poor,
see González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 23; Many of the PDC politicians, including
Frei, were educated at the Catholic University by radical priests, see Virginia Marie Bouvier,
Alliance or Compliance:Implications of the Chilean Experience for the Catholic Church in Latin
America (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University,
1983).
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clubs and other local groups.267 Between 1964 and 1970, roughly 21,917 organizations were
assembled under Popular Promotion, in which over 660,000 people participated.268 This
included 3,487 neighborhood councils and 9,000 mothers’ centers.269 Although the Frei era was
quintessentially one of bourgeois politics, behind the scenes there was immense public support
for taking ownership of one’s struggles and aggressively seeking change.
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Figure 6.1. Map of Operación Sitio locations (Source: Gideon Long, “Story of Cities #33: how
Santiago tackled its urban housing crisis with ‘Operation Chalk,’” the Guardian April 29, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/apr/29/story-cities-33-santiago-chile-housing-crisisoperacion-sitio-operation-chalk#img-3)

In 1964, Frei’s Operación Sitio (Operation Housing Site) functioned by granting the poor
land purchased from private developers by the government.270 It became known as Operation
Chalk (Tiza), as between 1964 and 1970 up to new 65,000 plots were literally drawn out by
residents with chalk.271 On the new plots the program went about “…providing semi-urbanized
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sites for people to build their own housing.”272 The 1964 self-help program shaped the
neighborhoods of Sara Gajardo, Las Parcelas, Villa O’Higgins, and La Herminda, where an
estimated 100,000 families benefitted from these lots.273 Two years into the program, however,
funds ran out, and Operación Sitio was forced to reach out to the Chilean Chamber of Private
Builders, who required that the focus of the housing project be reoriented away from the poor.274
This self-help program established neighborhoods for the poor in peripheral suburbs like San
Miguel, Conchalí, Barrancas, and La Cisterna, as illustrated by the above map. The same
problematic regions of the city lingered on from the initial carving up of Santiago.
In 1965 MINVU (the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism) was formed and charged with
handling all matters of housing and planning. The ministry remained Chile’s principal housingrelated tool after the 1960s, and remains so to this day. The new ministry, armed with capacities
unrivaled by previous generations, went about pursuing massive projects in home construction,
zoning, standardization, etc. MINVU was composed of “…28 institutions depending on 8
departments relating to housing.”275 It centralized all the government’s precursor housing
agencies; it absorbed and or guided CORVI, CORHABIT, CORMU (the Corporation of Urban
Improvement), and numerous other private, public, and hybrid housing related organizations.276
MINVU initiated an intercommunal plan for greater Santiago and commenced suburban
zoning.277 The plan dictated uniform lot sizes for single-family homes built of solid materials

González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City, 89.
This was coupled with the Popular Savings Plan, which provided private loans for home
repair, see Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, 50-51.
274
Ibid., 51.
275
“Historia del ministerio de urbanismo y vivienda.”
276
Ibid.
277
Ibid.
89
272
273

along a grid pattern, which was intended to ensure expanded access to transportation and
government institutions.278 It was crafted by working closely with USAID and the IDB and
aimed to “sanear” (sanitize) neighborhoods and “integrate” inhabitants.279 With regard to
downtown dwellings, “…government strategies within the domain of urban planning and design
introduced a mandatory typology of twenty-story apartment towers.”280

The MINVU Archives: Planning for Lower-income Santiago in the Late 1960s
Chile’s robust history of grassroots organization provided for well-informed and
experienced citizens of the lower classes, as evidenced by the types of petitions MINVU
received in its first five years. Poor inhabitants elected representatives to appeal for their needs
in the transition to the new government body. A petition in the MINVU archives inquired (in
legal jargon) whether new homes would be held to the same standards as those under CORVI
and Social Security.281 Requesting housing through the state required navigation of complex
bureaucratic structures, forcing the poor to recruit the assistance of middle class professionals. 282
Labor leaders were amongst the loudest and most influential in pressuring for the construction of
dwellings.283
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MINVU used many of the same tactics that proved successful in the past. For example, it
incentivized lending for affordable housing, as the Central Bank offered a “rediscount” to
smaller banks. For buildings to qualify they had to comply with exact standards recently
outlined by MINVU.284
The working-class San Miguel neighborhood south of downtown, where the city’s poor
had traditionally been abandoned, received the bulk of the assistance and attention from MINVU
and other government bodies in the second half of the 1960s. An October 1967 document
addressed to the Director of MINVU highlighted recent talks between the Urban Planning
Development sub-department and the Minister of Public Health “…about the situation of a
habitable zone in the middle of a frozen industrial zone of the community of San Miguel…285
The document pointed to the MINVU Plan, and that per the new ordinance “…in the mixed
zones with bothersome industry or frozen industrial zones, the installation of new bothersome
industries is not permitted and the existing ones can only extend or improve themselves.286”
MINVU officials utilized Santiago zoning ordinances to enforce physical change in the
neighborhood and improve the quality of life, frequently openly favoring the rights of citizens
and their dwellings over industrial development. Housing placement became recognized as
linked to quality of life: “The localization of households in these areas are contemplated
considering beforehand the inconveniences that their installation can generate for the residents of
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them.”287 Even the poor apparently might deserve a life free of the noisy, polluting, imposing
factories, and as such zoning ordinances would hypothetically guard the San Miguel residents
from “harmful industries,” which otherwise would take liberties to expand unchecked.
MINVU ambitions included supplying residents with access to ample public space, which
in turn could be positioned in strategic ways to serve other planning goals. A June 1968
document described a large T-shaped “Projected Park,” designed to “…solve the lack of Green
Spaces in this sector.”288 The park in San Miguel espoused the ideals of practical zoning, and
specifically attempted to segregate industrial and residential development with a buffer zone
where “… [Virginia street] widens to 25 meters, between Central Avenue and 1st Street as to
isolate the Industrial block from the Housing Zone.”289 Public works could assist the planners in
influencing the private development, over which it did not have direct control. MINVU zoning
policies in San Miguel took as their purpose serving residents through gently guiding the path of
development, gradually dampening the problems associated with proximity to factory pollution
or disconnectedness from public transportation and public space, for example.
Regulations and standards were of course also used to restrict resident’s construction and
direct settlement patterns, as the social engineering ideas of ALPRO and charities recommended.
Planning was used to alter neighborhood composition, and at times unreasonable expectations
equated to dislocation. A July 1968 document dictated that buildings in the industrial zone of
San Miguel were to be between 5 and 6 meters from the medians. Antejardíns (front gardens)
could not be extended too far toward certain streets. Fences along streets involved in the region
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could not exceed 2.4 meters.290 Presumably in this way laws managed to exclude many of the
families who carried with them their agricultural practices, and turned to their small plots for
extra subsistence. The document noted the advantages of this “…modification is the freeing of
future expropriation around 30 households of the Carmen Nueva neighborhood, with the
beneficial consequence for a numerous group of families who live there and which otherwise,
sooner or later need to be eradicated.291 MINVU officials promoted secure living conditions for
residents, but slum clearance was part and parcel of their idea of improving a neighborhood. In
this instance planners suggested the thirty San Miguel families would be better off if the
government hurried the inevitable slum-clearance process, showing they lacked true
understanding of or did not fully appreciate the needs of the poor.
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Figure 6.2. Conchalí addition (Source: Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Archivo Nacional
de la Administración, author’s photograph)

The Conchalí province to the north was another area of interest for MINVU as several
established homes wished to be officially incorporated. The community was composed of selfhelp homes though properties had been attained through land invasions on large portions of an
aristocratic family’s estate. The lines between squatter and self-help beneficiary were somewhat
blurred at this moment. In a letter addressed to the Director General of Public Works dated
February 1966, the suggestion was made that the agricultural neighborhood of “Villa Conchalí”
(formerly Villa Julio San Martin) be incorporated into the communal plan.292 Per a MINVU
document from November 1965, the Villa Conchalí residents had successfully petitioned for the
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inclusion of their neighborhood in October, based on “the Direction of Public Works in view of
that solicited by the representatives of the Society of self-help Villa Conchalí.”293
In February 1966, a document addressed to the Minister of MINVU and signed by the
Executive Vice President of CORVI, advocated for the appropriation of land privately owned by
one man and housing squatters, siding in favor of the Conchalí residents, as it was decided best
“…to declare necessary the lands owned by the Suc. Raúl Díaz Riesco, located in the
Community of Conchalí of this city, those which currently, one finds occupants of the
Neighborhood ‘JULIO SOTO PEÑA,’ composed of 123 illegal occupants.”294 The division of
this larger property into smaller plots was typical in Chile by this point. The document labeled
the residents “illegal” yet sought to provide a path to legitimate ownership, posing interesting
questions about the thin line between official or nonofficial.295 A planning survey illustrated that
the plots were in a neat polygonal shape, which it was assumed would make for seamless
incorporation.296 CORVI acted as the purchaser of the inhabited land, which was ostensibly
passed on to be developed. If land was going to be allotted to the occupants, it was going to be
done along a regulated plan that provided for easy integration into the city.
Las Condesa well-known middle and upper-class suburban neighborhood, not only in
the 1960s but in contemporary timeswas surprisingly susceptible to pressure from poorer
residents, per the MINVU archives. This same ambiguous squatting/self-help status of the
residents here provoked a debate over the incorporation of homes Las Condes. A text signed by
293
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the Director of Works and addressed to the mayor of Las Condes in July 1965 highlighted the
problems of some 250 families, which he describes as having “… a great number of persons of
scarce resource who live in conditions of instability and misery.”297 He suggested a study should
be conducted that would examine the benefits of incorporation and the suitability of the
community to mesh with the existing Las Condes residents.298 A document dated December
1965 furthered the incorporation of the neighborhood, now described as a “satellite zone.” It
was agreed CORVI would finance construction on the land, and that the 250 people would be
organized into four cooperatives; the document referenced the General Building and
Construction Ordinance as its rationale.299
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Figure 6.3. Las Condes addition (MINVU Archives, author’s photograph)
In a document signed by Juan Parrochia and intended for the “Lead Architect” at the
MINVU, he requested affordable housing be located on Avenue Las Condes, in front of
Fernández Concha.300 People like Parrochia had their eyes on large swathes of empty
aristocratic land, as it appeared foolish to let it sit there unused, given that both the rural and
urban poor were traditionally encouraged by the government to stakeout unused land.301 In
perspective this was a controversial request that implicated the general polarized class struggles
of Chilean society. Parrochia utilized the speculative plans for Las Condes and the 1960 census
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to showcase empty land in a low-density community sparsely populated by the middle and upper
classes whose “…population can be tripled within those same limits.”302 He envisioned the land
could accommodate another 300,000 inhabitants, and that it would be relatively easy to provide
these people with utilities, once they were concentrated in the neighborhood.303 For Parrochia, it
was common people who displayed more potential when it came to “geometric progression.”304
He wrote of communities that evidenced his assertions: “As an example it would suffice to visit
the illegal and unhealthy population that carried out the Municipality of Las Condes in the case
of the Mapocho River in this same sector, and another irregular population established along of
this same river between Centenario Avenue and the Polo Club.”305
However, the well-off residents of Las Condes learned early on that they could defend
their interests, for example the class or racial character of the neighborhood, via the same types
of actions and policies benefitting the poor. In February 1966, the mayor of Las Condes wrote
the Director of Planning at the Ministry of Public Works, this time calling for the incorporation
of houses considered tolerable and the eradication of those that were undesirable.306 The
neighborhoods of Puente Nuevo, San Enrique, and San Antonio, Vidal suggested, should be
incorporated into Las Condes.307 These three areas were selected for their solid construction, as
“…those which already have good buildings do not affect the future tracings of parks, nor
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avenues and previously established remodeling of the existing...”308 The land was to be given to
a “…group of appreciable communal workers…” who already lived there.309 The middle and
upper class approached planning in a way that appealed to the MINVU goals but contradicted the
struggles of the poor: for example, they supported professionals (many of whom were their
friends and relatives) in their quest for rationality and efficiency in order to skirt equality and
redistribution, even though architects protested that the poor had more potential for order. Only
some of the satellite communities materialized, such as that of Puente Nuevo, which existed on
land primarily owned by Suc. Max. Ibáñez.310 The 1960s were radicalized and progressive
enough that it was not farfetched to trust the poor to engage in orderly planning and construction,
even in a suburb with the reputation of Las Condes.
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Table 6.2. MINVU Study of Housing in 60 Communities

(Source: MINVU Archives)

MINVU took as its mission gathering comprehensive statistics on housing and
construction, as had become technocratic custom across the board internationally for planners of
this time. In a study of 60 comunas scattered throughout the country, MINVU tracked the
number of homes built and total construction costs of both the private and public sectors during
the decade. The category public sector depicted construction by any of the state-run
organizations, mostly CORVI and CORHABIT. The data was gathered from the institutions
themselves. The column labeled private sector showed construction not financed by the state,
100

and the numbers were gathered through municipal registries by observing building permits.311
Self-help homes, as has been evidenced here, were built with construction materials delivered by
either outside corporations (as in the U.S. company cited or Sert) or the Chilean state, thus
ostensibly they are included in both columns. The archival material does not shed light on
alternative methods for incentivizing housing construction, such as through tax breaks; the wide
scope of the umbrella term private would encompass such efforts.
The numbers suggest that both the private and public sectors contributed about an equal
amount of housing in the 1960s. The data gathered revealed some advantages of the multipronged response to the shortage that included pressuring the private sector into providing
homes, though ultimately it exposed clear flaws with the scale of Chilean housing programs.
The private and public sectors consistently through these years invested most of their
construction costs (about 75 to 80 percent) on housing. This other portion was either spent on
office, retail, and industrial buildings; or parks, roads, stadiums, etc. The private sector steadily
increased its production of homes through the decade, while state-sponsored projects usually
corresponded to U.S. aidfor example, in 1965, when the public sector saw a huge spike in
spending and homes constructed. The data implies that overall Chile was making slow progress
on its housing problem.312 Rounding up, in the 1960s both private and public sources provided
about 300,000 homes (some of whose beneficiaries might have been middle class) throughout
the whole country. There was a shortage of about 450,000 in Santiago alone at the beginning of
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the decade, making an increase in the shortage to nearly 600,000 at the beginning of the 1970s
foreseeable.
MINVU centered its efforts on squatters and the homeless, who were regularly
transferred to CORVI and self-help homes throughout the 1960s, but this did not manage to
approach solving the housing crisis by any means. The prioritization of the poor proved more
hortatory in nature than practical, as there was a very limited number of homes available. Some
poorer people did upgrade their homes, though this was restricted to a small vocal population
who could spare the time, labor, and money to pester officials via bureaucratic channels.
Beneficiaries of public housing in previous decades were ensured a reliable transition into the
new arrangement, as people rightly fretted over the possibility of invalidated titles and
backpedaling on gains. Class divisions, however, were not magically erased once poor areas
were included on a government map, and many lower-income people who merged into upscale
neighborhoods, like Las Condes, felt the repercussions after establishing their properties legally.
In resolute yet still anemic fashion, the 1960s continued the trends of Chilean affordable housing
of previous decades.

ALPRO Crumbles, Chileans Recover
The contradictions of economic aid and the social programs it produced in the late 1960s
eventually thwarted the entire effort, ripping it apart at the seams: the aims of ALPRO and the
IMF were not for Latin American economies to comprehensively recover, but rather just enough
to repay loans and to further open countries to foreign business interests. The flow of dollars
stimulated housing and construction but could not prevent radicalization, frustrating impatient
102

capitalists. The Chilean government simultaneously advocated for social programs while
exercising its power to contain. For example, when workers organized and seized their
workplaces during strikes at two Anaconda copper mines, the state intervened. The crackdown
resulted in the arrest of 800 and death of 22 people.313 The Frei administration took some steps
toward nationalizing industries, but marched police into the mines, factories, and shanties at the
first sign of a threat.
In 1966 alone U.S. aid totaled $112 million. The U.S. ambassador, Ralph Dungan, took a
hands-on approach, working in Santiago slums with residents in self-help assembly.314 However
the situation was beyond repair, as even President Frei, the beneficiary of ALPRO propaganda,
had become disillusioned. In a 1967 Foreign Affairs article he declared that the “Alliance had
lost its way” and that assistance favored elites over those in need.315 The IMF and World Bank
responded that austerity measures should be adopted, including cutting public housing, but Chile
instead rejected U.S. aid altogether, taking issue with Yankee intervention in the Dominican
Republic and Peru.316 As a result the Christian Democrats were forced to drastically cut their
budget in 1967, though home construction did not bear the brunt of it.317
In the late 1960s, leaders of government bodies resigned from their posts in acts of
protest. Influential Catholic figures withdrew their support for Eduardo Frei and the Christian
Democrats when they noticed a lack of results as to the poor, specifically those who had lived
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and spent time amongst the poblaciones.318 The general population followed suit, voting for
more radical and progressive alternatives. The PDC fell particularly short when it came to its
promises for land reform. Frei was stuck navigating a delicate balancehe was losing support
from the more radical and progressive elements for not doing enough and attempting to keep
order through violent crackdowns, while simultaneously fending off U.S. interests and demands.
Chile had urbanized at an astounding rate, generating unprecedented homelessness in its
cities by the 1970s. The housing crisis could only be solved through comprehensive economic
reform that prioritized equality, as well as the perpetuation of localized social programs. Frei
made a valiant effort with ALPRO and other assistance; his administration constructed about
228,398 units during his six years, falling short of a stated goal of 360,000. However, many of
those who benefitted were not the most marginalized, as his administration provided only
121,000 of the 213,000 houses projected to be needed by low-income residents.319 Murphy
concludes that this was largely due to pressure from the influential private Chilean Chamber of
Construction. This housing deficit had risen to 585,000 by 1970.320 In short, Salvador Allende
inherited a nearly unmanageable situation from Frei.

Zenith of Land Invasions
Self-help, Operación Sitio, Popular Promotion, programs intended to dampen
radicalization and public discontent, in many ways energized common people to do exactly the
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opposite, specifically in the sense that the actions encouraged bore a remarkable similarity to
squatting, land invasions, and building shanties from found materials. In the middle of the
decade, about 50 percent of the pobladores were unemployed.321 Between 1963 and 1967 places
like La Granja to the south of downtown and Conchalí to the north became important
battlegrounds for the land invasion movement.322 The narrative of the late 1960s became
dominated by leftist pobladores, their conquered tomas serving as centers of culture and music,
as with the Campamento Violeta Parra, named after the famous populist folk singer.323
All eyes were on the powder keg as it unfolded in public parks, unoccupied vineyards,
and in the backyards of the elite; small numbers of people made an immense impact on policy.
The most famous 1960s land invasion took place in the middle of the night in Renca on March
16 1967, led by Gladys Marín and the Barrancas homeless committees.324 The pobladores were
countered by police tear gas and water cannons, in what amounted to a seven-hour battle.325 The
squatters’ struggle built the neighborhood of Herminda de la Victoria, named after a baby that
died of sickness during the cold of night.326 Two and a half months later the Christian
Democrats made a deal with the bellicose homeless, and, conducting a survey through the
Ministry of Interior, enrolled 642 of the 1,098 families in state housing programs.327 Residents
agreed to provide their own labor to construct their new community’s infrastructure and utilities.
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There was no slowing down the drive for affordable housing and land invasions. This
was buttressed by a sophisticated culture of architecture and planning, as well as organized
working and lower classes, accustomed to the air of progressivism and leftism. Despite Frei’s
rejection of ALPRO, in 1968, after having funds withheld as a penalty, Chile opened back up to
U.S. investments, receiving $846 million;328 though the same year land seizures in Santiago
spiked to a high of 27 for the year.329 By 1969 CORHABIT estimated that 45,000 people needed
“housing solutions,” totaling 23,000 units.330
Land invasions were violently repressed at the end of the decade, contrasting with the
tolerance and even acclaim given them by some members of the political establishment. In early
1969 the army invaded a squatter settlement in the southern city of Puerto Montt, killing 11
homeless and injuring 70 with gunfire, setting off a chain of discontent.331 Disgusted, the
homeless orchestrated between 73 and 148 land seizures in response to the violence in 1969.
Poblaciones were named after leftist figures like Marx, Lenin, Che, and Angela Davis. 332 One of
the most revered invasions was the May 1st establishment of Población Primero de Mayo, when
Renca’s homeless committee prepared a march from the Communist Party headquarters to
Recabarren, where they camped out on a portion of a vineyard.333 Five days of police occupation
followed, during which time only food, water, and temporary shelter materials were allowed into
328
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the encampment.334 On May 5 one hundred protesters moved from Renca to the steps of the
governor’s building, amazingly succeeding in having the homeless committees elevated to a
neighborhood council, and in turn attaining access to government architects and planners.335
Murphy elaborates that for Renca “…MINVU organized the campamento into ten distinct
sections, which eventually became city blocks. Each committee of the homeless occupied a
different block, following a common practice that preserved the neighborhood identity that the
pobladores had before the land seizure.336” The back and forth was fraught with physical danger,
but even in this precarious context the poor and their champions proved unwavering. The
grinding process was surprisingly effective despite obvious flaws, prefiguring the progressive
1970s, when significant strides would be made against homelessness.

Housing and Architecture of the Late 1960s
The homes of the 1960s revealed the ambitions of the radicalized public. Construction
increased with U.S. aid, but still could not scale with the explosive urbanization, as that was not
materially possible. Now homes were packaged as mass earthquake-resistant concrete boxes,
which was cost-effective and satisfied both the demands of Chilean professionals (quickly
morphing into leftists) as well as U.S. consultants. Chileans once again considered investing in
foreign professionals: correspondence at the end of 1962 took place between Chilean architect
Sergio Larraín and Paul Lester Weiner, wherein the former sought to acquire technical assistance
to build a 20-story plus multi-use project in the central plaza in Viña del Mar (which would
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include in substantial part, affordable workers housing, as required of construction companies
under Chilean law).337 Lower income housing was encouraged by law, and, despite the
pervasive presence of foreign lending, protectionist policies remained in place to safeguard
national interests. In this instance a potential contract with Sert and Wiener disintegrated due to
investment constraints. It illustrates, however, the adventurousness of the Chilean government
and the willingness to invest funds in eminent leaders in the planning and architecture fields.

Figure 6.4. Villa Frei, 1965-68, by Jaime and Osvaldo Larraín and Diego Balmaceda (Source:
http://www.arquibus.cl/en/227-oriente/villa-presidente-frei/)
Avant-garde and modernist architects, the product of educational reforms in the 1940s
and 50s, and eager for a chance to display the value of their techniques, seized opportunities to
design countless apartment complexes in the 1960s. CORVI sponsored several modernist
337
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housing projects in the early part of the decade, such as the 1960 to 1963 Olympic Village,
Santiago, which “…was based on large blocks within which courtyards were formed.”338 It
housed about 1,000 to 2,000 people.339 Other bodies like CORMU (the Corporation of Urban
Improvement) created in 1965, sponsored a large percentage of the modernist projects in
Santiago between 1966 and 1976, but explicitly favored the middle class.340 The organization
ran parallel and often in partnership with MINVU. Projects, such as the remodeling of the San
Borja neighborhood, in turn, were inspired by CORVI and CORHABIT.341 Villa Frei (1965-68),
depicted above, stands out as a sample of Chilean modernism, echoing Le Corbusier and other
modernists with its noticeable zig-zagging outdoor staircases. Architects maximized the
potential use of materials and space, as both were scarce. The city was once again extended
upward; structures were erected to be monumental, representative of the communal struggle. The
poor were to live vertically, to abandon single-family houses for multi-family apartments.
Emilio Duhart was one of the most distinguished architects to emerge from this class of
Chilean modernists. He completed a master’s degree under the influential modernist Walter
Gropius at Harvard, and then became the Director of the Institute of Urban and Housing
Planning in Santiago from 1953 to 1960.342 In 1960 he was awarded the chance to design the
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United Nations CEPAL building in Santiago, which was completed in 1966, with the assistance
Brazilian landscape architect Roberto Burle Marx, who planned the surrounding park.343 The
building is still celebrated internationally as an outstandingly brilliant piece of Latin American
architecture.
Duhart explained the peculiar nature of Chilean architecture and planning in a 1969
interview following a UNESCO meeting in Argentina; while he had the opportunity to design the
CEPAL building, he shared with most Chilean architects an inability to specialize in one type of
architecture.344 Duhart relayed an explicit take on low-income housing, especially within the
context of Chile, which he considered ‘advanced’ among Latin American countries, along with
Argentina:
“In the case of a public building, I think the architect makes himself, as in the traditional
sense of the word, a true creator, an organizer of the functional, plastic, and
constructional space. He really is the person in charge of the construction. In the case of
housing projects I think the architect should be more of an urbanist, an organizer of the
projects, than a designer of the house itself. I believe that, going back to a tradition that’s
as old as cities itself, the houses should be built by the people who are going to live in
them, and we should tend towards that, not because of a sort of populism, not only
because of a sentimental populism, but because of simple logic and reason.”345

Duhart showcased a Chilean architecture practice with decades of affordable housing
projects experience. He noted problems with mechanical inhuman apartments and cities, but did
not see himself as opposing the likes of Le Corbusier, who he pointed out understood this need
for self-construction in Algeria, as well as a Dutch group exploring similar issues.346 The idea
that housing and planning were inseparable was commonly agreed upon by Chileans. Decades
of proficiency with planning and architecture, paired with a progressive political context, primed
343
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Chile’s professionals for a bold approach to affordable housing. Adaptiveness and effectiveness
was paramount. Residential buildings were only there to serve the residents, so, for Duhart, an
architect was to be a selfless tool of the people.
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Conclusion
To achieve development, industrialization, and a modern centralized state, the Chilean
economy needed to locate natural resources and create industries to generate products for the
global market. To those ends the Chilean elite and state pursued settler colonialism and
expansion, yielding new territory and resource-rich lands. Initially the economy relied on
nitrates and copper in the north, and in contemporary times in the south on the timber and fishing
industries on land of the native Mapuche.
The explosive growth of mining in turn promoted infrastructure and urbanization.
Chilean cities formed along the routes by which copper and nitrates left the country. Santiago
and Valparaíso became the country’s economic nucleus. Rural dwellers flooded into this central
urban zone throughout the twentieth century in search of opportunities, however scarce. In 1930
after the depression and crash of the saltpeter industry, even miners packed up for the SantiagoValparaíso area. At that time two thirds of the nation’s population still lived in rural areas,
where landlords reigned over huge agricultural plots exploiting native-descended inquilinos (a
situation that continued well into the 1960s and 70s). But again, by 1970 two thirds of the
population lived in cities, reversing these ratios.
Incentives led the wealthy and politicians to build or buy tenement-style conventillos.
Landlords squeezed high rents out of the poor, and especially new migrants, while returning little
in maintenance, utilities, or other services. Those unable to afford rent settled in makeshift
shanties, first as ranchos along the Mapocho river, and later as pobladores invading large
swathes of land who pitched up tents and constructed shacks, making their own unofficial claims
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of ownership. Just as the availability of jobs could not adequately sustain the population,
housing could not nearly maintain pace with its swelling ranks.
Urban Chileans nevertheless proved themselves to be imaginative and ambitious in the
face of such limitations. The development of middle and professional classes, although they
often maintained close relationships with the old aristocracy and shared kinship ties with it,
resulted in stronger representation of the poor masses and consideration of their basic needs.
Workers who formed unions and went on strike were emboldened and supported by popular
opinion, and in turn carved out an influential voice for their causes. Grassroots organizations
like neighborhood committees, women’s clinics, and even soccer teams also substantially
reflected the needs of their communities.
Populism and radicalism flourished, making serious electoral gains and demanding social
assistance programs. Liberation theology unabashedly promoted the struggle of the poor.
Reform broke through the constraints of those initially who promoted it, if only for purposes of
maintaining the status quo of power and wealth. Influential sections of the elite increasingly
turned toward development and social programs as a way of quelling popular discontent among
the masses. At the heart of these efforts was development of adequate housing. Related efforts
involved connecting all city dwellers to public utilities like potable water, electricity and
transportation (as is vital to modernization), as well as sunlight, air, green public space, etc.
The idea that the state, with the assistance of private investors and organizations, could
feasibly put a roof over every family and otherwise adequately attend to the basic residential
needs of all seemed entirely plausible to Chileans in the middle of the twentieth century. Viewed
through a contemporary lens these ambitions appear utopian, but an impressive history of
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housing efforts suggests otherwise. This optimism was understandably partly rescinded when
the realities of dependence and the globalizing economy set in around the middle of the century,
not to mention the actions imperial forces used to defend a capitalist world vision. Between
1920 and 1973 housing assistance bodies and laws in Chile (including MINVU, CORVI,
CORMU, CORHABIT, Operación Sitio, U.S.-backed self-help, and others) made striking
progress in their capabilities for building and repairing homes. Initiatives were slow to gain
steam, but as early as the 1950s the results of the decades-long commitment were evident in
thousands of new houses. By the 1970s, in Allende’s three years, the nation was arguably on
track to largely eliminate urban housing shortages.
Although aspirations repeatedly far outmatched material possibilities and budgetary
constraints, Chilean professionals took to heart the struggle of the poor. Planners and architects
sincerely adopted the mission of ending housing shortages and inadequate living conditions.
This type of utopic thinking made more reasonable gains plausible, as demanding the most
comprehensive societal reforms resulted in more success than complying with minimally
progressive proposals.
A strong correlation between developments in the Chilean professions of architecture and
urban planning and the general political climate of the county existed, meaning that as
progressivism, reformism, and radicalism made gains so did the capabilities and resources of
technical experts. At the same time the government sought to replace what was once informal
growth with government planning.
Schools of thought within professions adopted technocratic approaches to poverty that
implicitly suggested technique alone could conquer housing deficiencies. Chileans turned to
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importing technical assistance from abroad early in the twentieth century. They adopted the
most innovative international practices, albeit filtered through the constraints of on-the-ground
conditions. Urban design and modernism became the standard by the late 1960s, the most useful
tools for attacking housing shortages and problems of urbanization.
While expressly aiming to assist poor residents, in practice planning under liberal
capitalist structures segregated Santiago along class lines. Zoning and placement of affordable
housing channeled the poor away from downtown to expansive poor suburbs. The rich
established their own communities not far from the city center to the east and north, now a
landscape dominated by luxury shopping and security complexes. The physical reshaping of
cities, both intentionally and unintentionally, located barriers between the classes in the forms of
freeways, parks, canals, train lines, etc.
The reformism of the early 1960s did not yield the results intended by foreign capitalists
and ALPRO funders or the Chilean elite and sections of the middle class; indeed, instead of
preventing discontent and activism the program provoked and encouraged it. Even Frei himself
admitted to its failure. The poor, however, seized the moment and made monumental gains in
standard of living. Land invasions in this era evidenced a clear trend that the pobladores did not
intend to give up their relentless quest for adequate housing. They did not even abide by the
Marxist Allende’s plea for an end to the overnight encampments.
The Chilean history of affordable housing, shanties, squatting, and land invasions
exemplified the possibilities of radical and progressive movements to make material gains within
adverse capitalist contexts. Sadly, if not perhaps predictably, the democratic choice made in
Chile to embrace a move toward real equality was met with organized violence by reactionary
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forces. Conservatives and moderates organized to refuse socialism, as evidenced by the
glorification of Pinochet still espoused by some in contemporary times.347 Furthermore, the
United States’ view of Chile as fundamental to the ideological defeat of radicalism in Latin
America, and globally, led to its backing of the collapse, and in turn establishing a trend of
funding neoliberal governments and outright ruthless dictatorships in other parts of the world to
prevent leftist threats.
The demand for adequate urban housing is however not a mere artifact of those times. It
remains an issue of burning importance given the contemporary state of global megacities and
their miles and miles of slums. Chile itself still struggles with shanties and homelessnesstake
for instance the ever-present threat of fire wiping out the sheds lining the hills of Valparaíso.
One can hope that fragments of the prior Chilean devotion and optimism for providing affordable
housing have outlasted the victory of anticommunists and a nearly complete withdrawal of
interest in housing the poor on the part of financiers and the state. This long struggle is not a
closed book.
Similarly, the techniques adopted in Chile to combat housing shortages and inadequacies
over forty years ago should remain entirely relevant to these lingering and unsolved problems.
The adoption by experts over decades of advanced methods for constructing affordable and
adequate housing hopefully likewise have also outlasted neoliberalism’s starving of housing
assistance for the poor.
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Epilogue: Allende through Today
Salvador Allende’s administration (1970-73) remained committed to the housing and
land reform promises of his predecessors, while encouraging additional experimentation within
the planning and architecture community. Affordable housing gained strength with ALPRO
funds and blossomed even further during the short Allende presidency, as his government
invested trust, confidence, resources, and labor in technocratic professionals.
Table 7.1. Population growth in Santiago and in the suburb of Renca

(Source: Murphy, For a Proper Home, 59)

Table 7.2. Percentage of Chileans living in cities

(Source: González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 47)

Between 1952 and 1970 more than half a million Chileans had moved to Santiago,348 and
most were women and children. About 3.5 million women and 3.2 million men lived in cities in
1970.349 Out of a workforce of 3,189,000 only 191,000 were unemployed,350 but many still
could not find homes. The central urban corridor around Santiago consisted of densely
populated semi-urban shanties, an area of rampant poverty rather than a single-family paradise.
For instance, in November 1970, as Salvador Allende was being inaugurated, as many as
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300,000 still lived in Santiago shanties.351 In the 1970s, poor residents continued local
organizing, working to secure housing rights, and erecting structures and claiming land as their
own. Allende responded. Under the Popular Unity government in 1970 MINVU contracted for
upwards of 73,000 new houses, while CORVI planned for another 30,000.352 The new
administration sought a complete overhaul of the city and the eradication for good of
homelessness.
Grassroots organizing, moreover, gained even more importance in the Allende years.
Neighborhoods were molded with the input and counseling of local organizations. A meeting
representing eastern San Miguel in October of 1971, a group composed of “…fifteen
cooperatives, eighty mothers’ centers, eight women’s groups, eighteen sports clubs, four primary
schools, and a Christian parish,”353 epitomized such efforts. Community-decided plans were
transferred up the chain of command without being lost in a bureaucratic vortex.
The Allende government nationalized copper and seized banks in 1970, bringing access
to credit, and enabling the government to distribute extensive amounts of housing loans. The
government pointed to the 40,000 living in the mud in Santiago as its rationale for emergency
measures.354 Residents needed more than simply housing, so actions were taken under Allende
to deliver milk and clothing, and to build needed infrastructure.355 Even with such expanded
capabilities and efforts, the housing shortage still increased to 800,000 by the end of his term.356
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The material situation in Chile worsened in the 1970s, a collapse that economic planners were
forced to watch run its course, try as they might to control it.
Several groups were not content with the new government and made their opposition
known. Marxist parties to the left of Allende stepped up their struggles. The MIR
(Revolutionary Left Movement) and the “maximalists,” for example, pushed their agendas in the
shanties and poblaciones.357 The MIR coordinated an invasion in the middle-class Las Condes
neighborhood during the Allende years.358 Brand new apartment towers intended for the middle
class were seized and repurposed shortly after completion, or at times before. This was a bold
challenge to the continuation of class divisions as they manifested physically.
Land invasions and demonstrations did not end during Popular Unity but rather
increased. Between 1970 and 1973 invasions increased tenfold, accounting for a quarter of the
Santiago shanty populationabout 300,000 to 400,000.359 Residents familiar with the living
standards promised in the Frei years demanded nothing less, such as in 1970 in the May Day
campamento, when residents chanted “let’s move on up” in protesting apartment downgrades.360
By the time Allende called for an end to all land seizures, they were common practice: 14
percent of the population participated in them between 1967 and 1973 (279,000 people).361
There were 560 land seizures between 1970 and 1971, with 350 staged in Santiago itself. A land
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seizure was organized nearly every day for a year.362 The avalanche of new arrivals largely
stunted the progress that was in motion or had been previously achieved.

Figure 7.1. Open City (source: http://www.barqo.cl/v1/proyecto.php?tipo=275)

By the late 1960s most notable Chilean architects were undeniably modern; by the early
1970s they were devising their own avant-garde aesthetics that posed challenges and pushed
boundaries. Alberto Cruz and his Ciudad Abierta (Open City) group were awarded a blank plot
in Ritoque about fifteen miles outside of Valparaíso, where the team was encouraged to
materialize their desire to instill architecture with a poetic sensibility.363 The project had been
planned as a 270-hectare project along two miles of sand dunes along the Pacific shoreline, and
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was initiated as far back as 1969.364 As Pérez de Arce explains: “There is not a master plan for
the Open City, but rather a concatenation of schemes devised within the horizon of a ‘non-plan.’
Yet each act of construction heeds the particularity of its setting.”365 It was imagined as a fluid
city, able to adapt to and learn from the wishes of its inhabitants. Ciudad Abierta took as its
principle the grassroots bottom-up methods promoted under Frei and Allende.
Prefabrication remained a popular concept in Chile in the 1970s. Soviet influence,
support, and aid was present, but limited. Brezhnev offered Allende the same benefits given to
Cuba.366 This included machines like cement mixers, and even an entire prefabricated housing
factory.367 The Soviets actively attempted to export a method of prefabrication used for housing
blocks to the country, but it did not take hold.368 There were several other Chilean attempts at
prefabricated housing techniques under Allende, such as a program run out of an abandoned
Citroën Chile SA factory, and another that utilized wooden frames with composite panels, but
these floundered quickly.369
In 1971 Allende asked the head architects of CORMU, Miguel Lawner and Jorge Wong,
to design a building for UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development).
The project had to be hurried to meet the scheduled date of May 1972 for the conference.370
Architect José Medina was sent to Paris and New York to work with UN architects, in an effort
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to guarantee that the new structure had a cohesive look.371 The UNCTAD project transformed
several city blocks in the northern San Borja region of Santiago, and included the addition of
twelve new CORMU-owned residential towers.372 The UNCTAD building has been described
as “Brutalist” in style, massive and undecorated.373 A worker shared his feelings on the
UNCTAD project: “‘It makes me proud, comrade, that in Chile we build luxurious things, and
workers do not have to show an ID at the entrance. But one cannot feel like the owner of this
huge mass, because one arrives home at night to a cabin in a shantytown, and it has always been
like this.’”374 Poverty remained ubiquitous, even though such communal projects inspired
solidarity in everyday people.
Organizations like CORMU that had frequently benefitted middle sectors of society were
repurposed for constructing monumental socialist architecture. For the Allende administration,
the rebooting of downtown Santiago was inseparable from housing the squatters. The same
funding of forward-thinking buildings like the UNCTAD building was applied to apartments. In
1972 a competition was held for a plan to renovate the Santiago city center. As Liernur portrays
it, the aim was “…to create housing for eighty thousand people, including the former settlers of
the area and the working people living in shantytowns in the city and in the encampments at is
outskirts. Construction of the winning entry, an ambitious urban network influenced by the idea
of CIAM Team X, was interrupted, however, by the military coup…”375 In the same year the city
hosted the VIEXPO international housing exhibition, which included a competition for the west-
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central area of Santiago.376 Near the end of Allende’s term the shanties lingered and the state
increased its attention to the problem.
U.S.-backed military general Augusto Pinochet and his followers partnered with the
Christian Democrats to engineer an economic crisis, including manufactured food shortages.377
Notoriously, the Nixon sought to “make the economy scream.” In October of 1972 the head of
the Chilean Truck Owners’ Association called for a strike, freezing the circulation of goods.378
The coup took place in June1973. At that time the rich in Las Condes had been surrounded by
the poor on all sides, provoking the wealthy into organizing committees for neighborhood
defense.379 Once Pinochet’s forces took control, the military stormed into the shanties. The
residents, hardened and radicalized from decades of experience protesting, fought back between
1973 and 1983 “…digging trenches, erecting burning barricades, and pelting military tanks with
rocks…”380 Poor neighborhoods like Herminda de la Victoria, La Lengua, Cerro Navia, and La
Pincoya were mobilized and militant.381
While the poor tirelessly opposed Pinochet during the two decades of the dictatorship,
they were consistently denied ground. Chile adopted neoliberal reforms beginning in the mid1970s, which set the standard of cutting government projects and deemphasizing government
hindrances on private business.382 With the coup urban reconstruction and housing construction
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in the slums was put on hold. The governments that followed Pinochet, while perhaps not
outwardly hostile to the poor, did little to restore housing programs.383 This situation has
undergone little change to the present.
MINVU, suffering through forty years of market-friendly administrations, ended up a
husk of its former self. Marcelo Zunino depicts the organization as leaning heavily on the
private sector, as with its promotion in 2001 of the “Great Urban Reform.”384 In the end,
government policies fostered a context where the divide between private and public was blurry,
allowing for private, moneyed interests to dominate most planning initiatives.385 Political and
social implications are tossed aside under this style of Santiago planning; what remains is a
brittle skeleton of technocratic and scientific solutions.386 MINVU’s contemporary approach to
planning involves the creation of centralized administrative posts. Their appointees are
ultimately reduced to convincing private investors to finance projects.387 In this way the private
sector dominates planning, aside from the single aspect of social housing, which is still the
domain of MINVU.
The results of market-directed planning have been drastic, and lacking in significant
aesthetic value, to say the least. In Santiago poverty is still rampant. The rich and middle class
have resorted to fortifying themselves behind gates, security cameras, and doormen, usually on
the northern end of the city or in newly created suburbs. As Borsdorf, Hidalgo, and VidalKoppmann reveal: “These are called barrios cerrados, urbanizaciones cerradas or condiminios
383
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and always feature walls and fences and a central entrance gate, often watch towers, 24-h
security staff, CCTV, pass control and other systems.”388 The staff for such compounds, as
expected, is recruited from the neighbors just outside their limits.389 Borsdorf, Hidalgo, and
Vidal-Koppmann point to a 1980 decree, which essentially allowed for the bulk sale of
agricultural plots to be subdivided and converted into fenced-in luxury condos. Many of these
sprang up in the western and southern regions of Santiago.390 They write: “Between 1994 and
2002 a total of 156,251 parcelas were created in c. 7500 fenced-in estates.”391 Satellite towns
like Pedra Roja, Valle Grande, Valle Norte, and La Reserva were designed to be entirely
exclusive to upper-class residents.392
Social housing under Pinochet and subsequent governments has been concentrated at the
periphery of the city, forcing the poor further and further out of view.393 Peruvian immigrants
have become the new lower class in much of Santiago, with the men working and living in the
city center, and the women primarily working and even living as domestic servants in rich
neighborhoods like Las Condes.394 The privatization of communal space extends beyond the
gated neighborhoods and out into the countless shopping centers, what Borsdorf, Hidalgo, and
Vidal-Koppmann deem “urban entertainment centres.” For example, the Costanera Center in
Providencia that towers above the whole city of Santiago, and from what I was told is the largest
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mall in South America.395 This trio of authors describes how the rich grew fond of the bohemian
charm of the lower-class Bellavista neighborhoodpacked with bars, clubs, and cheap Peruvian
foodeven taking up residence in the Lastarria quarter just across the river.396

Figure 7.2. Aravena’s half homes (Source:
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/565483296932034468/)
Out of the mélange of luxury condos and gated suburbs has emerged the internationally
celebrated architect Alejandro Aravena, who has carried the torch for both modernism and
affordable housing in Chile. Aravena’s comments in a 2016 New York Times article by Michael
Kimmelman suggest the architect sees Chile’s unique situation as having frozen his profession in
time, to positive results. Kimmelman writes, quoting Aravena: “We were saved from
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postmodernism,” Aravena told me. “By default, we were left to find our own identity. Our
professors were practitioners, not theorists, who taught how to get buildings built. It was, in
retrospect, a very useful education.’”397 Left to their own devices, without the dismantling of
modernism, technocratic neoliberal conditions in Chile have preserved a sentiment lost in much
the rest of the world. Aravena prioritizes the needs of the poor and keeps alive Chilean traditions
of prefabrication and self-help. His company ELEMENTAL builds “half-houses.” The homes
are equipped with essentials in a concrete or brick shella bathroom, kitchen, etc.with room
for the building of new rooms when the residents have the money.398 The residents do just this,
filling out the second half of the house with whatever materials they can get their hands on, and
completing the homes with their own personal styles.399 Aravena’s approach has been criticized
in many of the same ways modernist mass housing of the past has been. At the same time, the
recognition he receives implies these debates over how best to house the urban poor have not
necessarily been settled.
Chile’s fondness for the modernist past should be a reminder of a time when
ambitiousness and inventiveness were encouraged, a time when “ending homelessness” was not
some farfetched dream, but a practical approach to ameliorate a scientifically observed problem.
One can only hope that the residue of the robust social housing that developed in Chile will pay
some future dividends to the poor and society over all.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table A.1. Strikes by City

(Source: DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 165-166, see tables 6.1 and 6.3)

Table A.2. Strikes by Profession, 1920s

(DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 165-66)

Table A.3. Countrywide Construction of Homes in the 1960s.
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(Source: MINVU Archives)

Table A.4. Homes by Month in 1965

(Source: MINVU Archives)
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Table A.5. Homes by Month in the Late 1960s
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Appendix B: Names
Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna Vicuña completely reshaped Santiago in the 1870s using Paris as
a model and echoing 1853, when Napoleon III hired Georges-Eugène Haussmann to broaden
Paris streets, opening them up to sunlight and creating more sanitary conditions.400

Carlos Carvajal In 1906 Carlos Carvajal Miranda was named Inspector General of Architecture
in the Chilean Public Works Department, and was tasked with “…designing inexpensive,
earthquake-proof workers’ housing.”401 For Chilean planners like Carvajal, sanitation, housing,
and neatly planned cities were intrinsically linked. Between 1910 and 1912 he championed the
Society for Inexpensive Housing for Employees’, a never-materialized million-dollar project for
“Los Leones,” envisioned as a triangular community between a highway and a small
mountain.402

Ismael Valdés Valdés Civil engineer who was tasked with sketching a new plan for the city and
worked closely with Carvajal.403 By 1917 Valdés Valdés was claiming the science of urbanism,
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401

and in his La tranformación de Santiago, fixated on neighborhoods built from scratch, such as
Washington, La Plata, and Canberra.404

Luis Muñoz Maluschka Headed the General Law of Construction and Urbanization written as a
response the 1928 Talca earthquake.405 He was the disciple of Brunner and had a lasting impact
on planning for several decades, heading various housing and planning organizations.

Alberto Schade Pohlenz In 1928 Alberto he taught a class on urbanismo at the School of
Architecture of the University of Chile’s Faculty of Economic Sciences and Mathematics with a
syllabus clearly influenced by Camillo Sitte.406

Karl Brunner von Lehenstein Brunner was hired by the Chilean government in 1929 after the
Talca earthquake and working there for the next decade407 He inspired Chilean notables such as
Rodulfo Otarzún Philippi, Luis Muñoz Maluschka, Alberto Mackenna Subercaseaux, and
Alfredo Prat Echaurren.408
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Arturo Almandoz, “Introduction,” in Karl Brunner, Manual de Urbanismo Volume 1 (New
York: Rouledge, 2016), xiv.
408
Isabel Pavez, “El archivo Karl Brunner,” Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo de la
Universidad de Chile, Resita de Arquitectura 8: 33, accessed April 21, 2015,
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404
405

Rodulfo Oyarzún Chilean Architect Rodulfo Oyarzún met Karl Brunner in 1927 while studying
in Vienna, and suggested the Austrian visit his homeland.409

Josué Smith Solar Son of a North American engineer and educated in the U.S., he redesigned
the public space in front of the Moneda.410 Smith Solar collaborated with José Smith Miller to
create the campus for the Valparaíso Universidad Federico Santa Maria between 1928 and
1931.411

Emilio Duhart Earned a master’s degree under the influential modernist Walter Gropius at
Harvard, and then became the Director of the Institute of Urban and Housing Planning in
Santiago from 1953 to 1960.412 In 1966 he completed the United Nations CEPAL building in
Santiago with the assistance Brazilian landscape architect Roberto Burle Marx, a staple of Latin
American modernism.413
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Appendix C: Timeline of Housing Laws and Significant Planning Events
1880s Laws Two low-income housing laws were ratified: the first in 1883 offered incentives to
private investors for the construction of worker housing within the municipality of Santiago, and
the next in 1888 sought to regulate the conventillos.414 An 1889 law commenced the assembly
of Patronage Committees tasked with inspecting hygiene, improving worker housing, and
promoting investment in savingsHidalgo Dattwyler likens this to an earlier Belgian law.415

1888 Directorate of Public Works Undertook major projects like installing a new drainage
system for Santiago.416 Initiated the ability of the municipal government to build community
projects.

1891 Law of Autonomous Community Prohibited the construction of ranchos in certain sectors
of the city, as well as promoted the construction of hygienic dwellings.417 The law dictated
minimum urbanization qualifications for official incorporation as a neighborhood.418 Hutchinson
portrays the elite as having coordinated the 1891 Law of Autonomous Community to eliminate
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the eyesore of the ranchos. It achieved this by allowing government bodies to purchase areas
lining the Mopocho River419

1905 Sanitary Convention took place in Santiago and summarized earlier Inter-American
Conferences of 1897 and 1902, bringing international attention to Chile’s struggle with
hygiene.420

1906 Law of Worker Housing Created local housing councils made up of “…officials from the
central government, the municipalities, and the church, in addition to state-appointed
representatives from worker societies,” the 1906 law also helped make accessible banking and
credit institutions to the poor.421

1906 Mortgage Credit Fund Initiated with the purpose of providing loans for housing projects.
Murphy suggests this program eventually excluded the poorest citizens in favor of more lucrative
and secure middle class residents, in a process eerily reminiscent of redlining in the U.S. 422

1908 and 1909 First Pan-American Scientific Conference Santiago hosted the meeting
covering issues such as sanitation, housing, and physical fitness.423 Spanish planner Soria y
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Mata was invited to attend the conference but was unable to, instead asking Carvajal to stand in
and present his writing “Rational City Planning as a Practical Solution to Low Cost Housing,”
which highlighted the atrocious infant mortality rates in Santiago—it was estimated two thirds of
newborns died in their first year of life.424 The presentation must have been well received, as
Carvajal would prove very active going forward in his career.

1910 Centennial celebration Ignited a carousel of projects. Three new rail stations were
constructed: the Mapocho, Central, and Pirque Stations.425 Areas like Club Hípico and Cousiño
Park were given the spotlight, and the Plaza Italia created a new landmark with its statue and
circular roads.426 The entire renewal plan was championed by the Central Society of
Architects.427

1915 Transformation Law Mayor Ismael Valdés Vergara pushed for the “transformation law,”
which gave birth to the Transformation Junta. It included civil engineer Ismael Valdés Valdés,
who was tasked with sketching a new plan for the city and worked closely with Carvajal.428 New
neighborhoods were to be submitted to the board as neatly planned proposals. The committee
regulated the heights and sizes of buildings, streets, and parks.429
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1925 Housing Law, or Decree Law 261 Protected renters from eviction for up to six months,
giving an opportunity to prove they had met sanitary standards.430 Inspections marked
conventillos unsanitary, whereby the landlords would be required to reduce the rent by fifty
percent.431 Walter outlines the February 1925 law: “The law stipulated the establishment of
housing committees (tribunals de vivienda) made up of representatives of the national and
municipal governments and the tenant leagues.”432

1925 Renters’ Law Assisted in securing the state’s role in housing, as well as equipping housing
programs with more regulatory oversight power.433

1925 Law of Affordable Housing, or Law 308 Favored housing cooperatives for the granting
of credit. Participants were offered such benefits on a conditional basis, to be revoked if they
were shown to be partaking in “immoral behavior” such as alcoholism, gambling, prostitution,
etc.434 This law created the Social Welfare Council, which replaced the 1906 Superior Council as
the teeth used to enforce housing laws.435

1928 Law of General Urbanization and Construction The 1928 earthquake in Talca furthered
the burgeoning interest in planning, as law 4,563 of 1931 required that “…every city with a
Hidalgo Dattwyler, “El papel de las leyes de fomento de la edifcación obrera,” 92; Hidalgo
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431
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430

population over 20,000 must develop a General Transformation Plan.”436 The law established
nationwide urban standards, for example, for the widths of streets and the heights of homes.437
The 1931 Urban Development and Construction General Law also spawned the Central Board of
Popular Housing, which in 1936 was rebranded as the Popular Housing Fund or CORHABIT,
and offered loans with twenty-seven year terms and initial payment of mortgages.438

1931 Law 4931 created the Popular Housing Junta to collaborate with the Social Welfare
Superior Council, which had been operating since the 1926 Affordable Housing Law.439 In
March, Decree with Legal Force No. 33 replaced the Junta de Habitación Popular with the
Popular Housing Central Junta, composed of representatives of several housing organizations,
which had access to the Mortgage Credit Fund.440 The president of the republic was to set the
maximum price for land values in the cities of Santiago, Valparaíso, Antofagasta, and Iquique.441

1932 Decree Law No. 402 The 1932 Housing Departmentfashioned by the Decreto Ley No.
402, which enforced the 1931 Decree with Legal Force No. 33was composed of five sections:
Technique, Juridical, Mining and Exploitation, Social Economy, and Administration.442 This
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organization undertook all construction duties, which were transferred from the Public Works
Department.443

1931 National Institute of Urbanism was formed to continue with the principles of scientific
urbanism, as outlined by Brunner.444 The Institute initiated the General Law of Buildings and
Urban Developments, which was combined with various other laws intended to assist the poor
and regulate urban growth.445

1936 Law 5950 Championed by the Senator Alejandro Lira Infante, enacted the Popular
Housing Fund or CORHABIT.446 It was anticipated to supply 1 billion escudos for 166 thousand
houses and a median value of 15 thousand escudos. With five people per family, the program
was to benefit some 333 thousand people.447

1935 Law 5579 Dictated that the President could issue plots in the name of the Housing
Department, “las mejoras” or “arrendamiento a piso,” effectively self-help plots.448 The
President regulated prices and guaranteed documents; “compraventa de sitios a plazo” (trading of
term sites), allowed people for the trading in of false documents.449
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1943 Law 7,600 Restructured the way CORHABIT was funded. Required that companies build
a minimum amount of worker housing proportional to profit.450 Through this law taxes were
levied on inheritance, legacies, and donations.451

1944 Ordinance of Urbanization and Affordable Constructions stipulated exact measurement
standards for affordable housing: structures were to be placed on surfaces of between 36 and 100
meters squared, as to support a multitude of housing typologies.452 The law regulated the
minimum space between homes, the maximum height of buildings and number of floors, as well
as minimum light and ventilation. Communities were required to be linked to potable water,
sewage, public lighting, and industrial energy and gas. Neighborhood designs were required to
include communal spaces and sufficient spacing and density.453

1948 Pereira Law Was intended to stimulate housing construction via state-backed
mortgages.454 Specifically geared toward the middle class.

1958 Santiago Intercommunal Regulatory Plan “…laid out the master plan for the city facing
challenges of metropolization.”455 The capital’s multiple municipalities were expected to benefit

450

Murphy, For a Proper Home, 61.
Policy makers explicitly aimed to tax mine owners and chip off a piece of the most lucrative
industry in the country, but this manner of tax reform, ironically, appears directed at the
aristocratic landlords who would keep money within the nation and pass it through inherence,
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from the coordinated uniform plan, and citizens were used to the idea of inter-communal
planning, which it was assumed would offer infrastructure and public services to disconnected
regions.
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